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Abstract 
This article, the first of a two-part series, argues that during the Framers’ era many if not 
most judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the 
adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment 
became effective.  This argument challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth 
Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999. 
The focus in this first article is upon an analysis of the common law and how it reflected 
the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions.  Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few 
case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause.  But it is a mistake to 
presume that the law was necessarily implemented in accordance with this elite guidance.  This 
is because justices of the peace, the non-elite judges who actually issued search warrants, had 
reason to believe that judicial sentryship of probable cause was often optional.  Evidence 
supporting this conclusion can be found in treatises, as well as manuals for justices of the peace, 
legal forms, civil search statutes, and case law, as well as the extended development of probable 
cause sentryship jurisprudence, which continued well past 1950.  American justice of the peace 
manuals and legal forms play a particularly important role in this story, as it is likely they had a 
profound influence on search warrant procedure given the laxity in legal education and judicial 
training, as well as the limitations on legal research, during the Framers’ era. 
This article challenges our current understanding of the Fourth Amendment, including the 
relationship between its Reasonableness and Warrant clauses, raises questions about originalism, 
and contributes to our understanding of the sources and methods used by judges during the 
Framers’ era, as well as by historians today.  These topics will continue to be explored in the 
second part of this series, which will focus upon statutory law from the Framers’ era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Probable cause is central to our understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s search and 
seizure protections, but it is more of a stranger than we generally acknowledge.  The Fourth 
Amendment tells us that probable cause plays a leading role in the issuance of warrants.  Its 
command sounds simple:  “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”1 The apparent 
simplicity, however, is surprisingly misleading.  It is clear that “probable cause” is different from 
“particularity,” another separate requirement the Fourth Amendment imposes before warrants 
may issue.2 “Probable cause” speaks to the circumstances justifying the request to search and 
whether they satisfy a required threshold of suspicion.3 “Particularity” requires that the warrant 
specify the place to be search and the items sought.4 Both serve to limit the searcher’s 
discretion.  Beyond that conceptual distinction, the exact import of “probable cause” is 
debatable. 
The constitutional “probable cause” command could be interpreted as imposing different 
requirements, each of which would result in widely differing judicial roles.  Does the probable 
cause mandate demand that judges act as vigilant sentries, aggressively inquiring into the merits 
of a probable cause assertion?  Or, at the other extreme, is the command satisfied when a judge 
acts in a merely ministerial manner, engaging in no gate keeping at all?  In this view, the 
mandate seems to impose only a duty to oversee the production of a record for a later motion to 
suppress.  Or does the command represent a middle ground, essentially reflecting a presumption 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
2 See id. 
3 See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 439, 441 (1925). 
4 See supra note 1; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 
U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
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that a warrant should issue unless the application is obviously defective, meaning that a judge’s 
sentryship role is satisfied by anything more than a mechanical, ministerial issuance of a 
warrant?5
Determining which definition is preferable is one issue; another is whether we share the 
same understanding of the probable cause concept as the Framers did.  This historical inquiry has 
become crucially relevant today because, with the conservative ascendancy on the Supreme 
Court, originalism has become both a mission and a promise,6 and this movement towards 
originalism has extended into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Since the 1990s the Court has 
occasionally suggested that original intent should be the first factor considered in modern Fourth 
Amendment cases.7 In one sense, this development should not be surprising.  The Fourth 
Amendment, with its dramatic and express limitation upon governmental power and its 
obviously implicit promise of individual privacy protection,8 presents an attractive target to 
 
5 My thanks to George Thomas for suggesting this tripartite framework during our 
discussions about this manuscript. 
6 The mission is to make it the dominant form of constitutional analysis.  The promise is 
twofold.  First, that by doing so we can achieve a level of jurisprudential coherence that 
previously has eluded us, or at least eluded us during the Warren and Burger Courts.  Second, 
that embracing originalism will help avoid incorrect constitutional rulings (which usually, but 
not always, have resulted in pesky expansions of constitutional protections), a trend that 
originalists view as not only unjustified but actually dangerous.  Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59-71 (1991), protesting the 
majority’s expansion of what constitutes a “prompt” probable cause determination for 
warrantless arrests, is a prime example of this belief. 
7 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326-27 (2001); Florida v. White, 
526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).  Many commentators have been critical of the Court’s 
interest in Fourth Amendment originalism.  See infra note 193. 
8 For example, even the newly elevated Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both 
superheroes to the conservative movement, cited the Fourth Amendment during their 
confirmation hearings as one constitutional provision evincing an individual privacy right.  Judge 
Samuel Alito, Transcript Of United States Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing On Judge 
Samuel Alito’s Nomination To Associate Justice Of The United States Supreme Court, 109th 
Cong. (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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originalists.  This is particularly so given that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, quite often until 
the 1990s but certainly between the late 1960s through the early 1990s (mostly the Warren and 
Burger Court years), so clearly followed paths other than originalism.9
Scholars have joined in the effort to gain a greater historical understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.10 One result has been dissonance concerning early judicial sentryship of probable 
cause.  The leading originalist account, by law professor Thomas Davies, concludes that as a 
 
dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html (“I do agree that the Constitution 
protects a right to privacy.  And it protects the right to privacy in a number of ways.  The Fourth 
Amendment certainly speaks to the right of privacy.”); Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., Transcript Of 
United States Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing On Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.’s Nomination 
To Be Chief Justice Of The United States Supreme Court, 109th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300876.html (“The right to privacy is protected under 
the Constitution in various ways.  It’s protected by the Fourth Amendment which provides that 
the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, effects and papers is protected.”). 
9 See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment And Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1739, 1739-41 (2000) (showing that, to extent history played role in Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prior to 1990s, it was often in dissenting opinions); see also id. 
at 1762-70. 
10 E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Terry And Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1097 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry & Fourth Amendment]; Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Fourth Amendment, Boston, And The Writs Of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) 
[hereinafter Amar, Writs Of Assistance]; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment]; Thomas Y. Davies, The 
Fictional Character Of Law-And-Order Originalism: A Case Study Of The Distortions And 
Evasions Of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine In Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
239 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Fictional Originalism]; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering The 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment]; Tracey Maclin, The Complexity Of The Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review,
77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 933 & n.36 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity]; 
Sklansky, supra note 9; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure And Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.1 (1997); WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY, THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING (1990) (Ph. D. Dissertation at 
Claremont Graduate School) [hereinafter CUDDIHY DISSERTATION].  Cuddihy’s dissertation came 
to prominence after Justice O’Connor cited it in a dissenting opinion.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Though unpublished, it is available 
through library holdings as well as Proquest Information & Learning, 777 East Eisenhower 
Parkway, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1346, telephone (800) 521-3042, 
facsimile (800) 864-0019, email info@il.proquest.com. 
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matter of legal doctrine judges in the Framers’ era11 were expected to act as vigilant probable 
cause sentries prior to issuing warrants.12 Throughout this article, when I refer to judicial 
sentryship, I am referring to this aggressive variety unless otherwise indicated.  By contrast, the 
leading historical account of the Fourth Amendment, by historian William Cuddihy, asserts that 
as a matter of legal practice judges in the Framers’ era did not widely engage in aggressive 
sentryship of probable cause.13 One point of this article is to more fully explore this dissonance.  
As will be explored in much greater detail below, I think Cuddihy is right. 
Another, and more important, purpose of this article is to point out that the increased 
focus upon the Fourth Amendment’s historical pedigree has not resulted in a sufficient 
reassessment of such fundamental concepts as suspicion or probable cause.  I touched on this 
subject in a previous article,14 and will continue to expand upon it in future articles.  The failure 
to reassess the roles of suspicion and probable cause is unfortunate.  The historical material 
amply supports the need for reexamining the Framers’ understanding of these concepts because 
abundant reasons exist to believe that the Framers’ views differed from our own. 
 
11 I use the phrase “Framers’ era,” and others like it, to refer to the period roughly 
bounded by 1787 (when the Constitution was drafted) and 1825 (when a new generation was 
taking over for the Framers; for example, James Madison, who drafted the Fourth Amendment, 
died in 1836).  Obviously, others may have differing opinions about the period that constitutes 
the “Framers’ era,” as well as about whether preceding periods are relevant to discerning the 
Framers’ intent.  (Indeed, I agree that earlier periods are relevant to understanding our Fourth 
Amendment history, as is implicit in my discussion in Part I below.)  My definition is useful for 
the purposes of this article, one of which is to understand the state of actual search warrant 
practice (as opposed to doctrine) during this early part of our history.  See infra note 13 and 
accompanying text.  In making this attempt, I try to emphasize legal texts from “the Framers’ 
era” as I have defined it, on the presumption that they are the most likely that were used. 
12 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
13 See, e.g., infra notes 101-102, 145, 152 and accompanying text. 
14 See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs And Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil 
Searches In The Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1235-46 (2004). 
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To properly understand history’s lessons, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of search 
and seizure jurisprudence during the Framers’ era.  During this period, Fourth Amendment 
claims as we know them today did not exist.  For about a century after the Constitution was 
adopted there was no constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence.15 Instead, search and 
seizure claims were litigated through common law trespass or civil law forfeiture.  This remedial 
division contributes to this article’s designation as “Part One.”  It focuses upon the common law 
trespass part of the puzzle, and only briefly considers statutory law.  The future article that will 
be “Part Two” will focus more deeply upon the statutory law applicable to civil law forfeiture 
claims, and explain what the intersection between the common and statutory law means for an 
originalist analysis of probable cause. 
A central point of both articles is that abundant reasons exist for believing that in our 
early history the judiciary did not always monitor the adequacy of prior suspicion during the 
search warrant application process.  In terms of the common law, the historical material is 
surprisingly equivocal.  It shows that a probable cause sentryship role on the judiciary’s part had 
been articulated, particularly in learned treatises, but at the same time suggests that such a role 
may not have fully developed at any point during the Framer’s era.  Given the concept’s 
articulation in influential treatises, it may well be that the Framers and other members of the 
legal elite embraced the concept, as Professor Davies believes.  The legal elite, after all, probably 
 
15 The Supreme Court’s first major Fourth Amendment decision was Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  The Court did not decide its next major constitutional search and 
seizure case until the next century. 
There were some federal cases prior to Boyd in which the Fourth Amendment was 
invoked, often in the context of a challenged warrant, but it is not clear that the Fourth 
Amendment was dispositive.  See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 613 & 
n.174.  In some early cases the Fourth Amendment sometimes is referred to as the Sixth 
Amendment as a result of two amendments having been dropped between when the Bill of 
Rights was proposed and as it was approved.  See id. at 723 & n.503. 
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had (relatively) easy access to these treatises, and likely read and trained from them.  But the 
legal elite did not implement and enforce search warrant procedures.  Rather, it is much more 
likely that non-elite lawyers and non-elite judges, like justices of the peace, participated in the 
day-to-day process of applying for, and issuing or denying, search warrants.  These non-elites 
probably did not have easy access to the leading treatises and sometimes had little meaningful 
legal training.  As a result, it seems likely that, even after the Fourth Amendment’s ratification, 
two conflicting legal worlds existed during the Framers’ era:  the legal elites’ aspirational one 
and the non-elites’ reality.16 
This insight informs the most fundamental debate that exists in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  This debate concerns the relationship between the Fourth Amendment’s two 
clauses, the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause.17 In contention is whether the initial 
determinant of constitutionality should be the Reasonableness Clause or the Warrant Clause and, 
if the latter, under what circumstances it is legitimate to turn to the Reasonableness Clause to 
justify the search.  The tension between these approaches is evident in the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,18 both in older cases19 and in its trend of judging the 
 
16 My thanks to Andrew Taslitz for helping me clarify my thinking about this issue 
during our exchanges about this manuscript. 
17 For the Fourth Amendment’s language, see supra note 1. 
18 Reasonableness Clause Preference: See, e.g., Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 
2201 n.4 (June 19, 2006); Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (May 22, 2006); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
652 (1995); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
147 (1925).
Warrant Clause Preference: See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 
(1996); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Chapman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); see also 
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept Of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
977, 994.
19 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (exemplifying this debate, 
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constitutionality of civil searches under the Reasonableness Clause20 and of criminal searches, in 
many but certainly not all instances, under the Warrant Clause.21 This debate is also active 
among legal scholars.  The strongest proponent of the Reasonableness Clause approach is 
Professor Akhil Amar, who in this respect has built upon the past work of Professor Telford 
Taylor.22 Many commentators hotly contest arguments for giving prominence to the 
Reasonableness Clause.  Among them are Professors Thomas Davies, Tracey Maclin, and 
George Thomas.  Professor Davies denies that a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard 
existed during the Framers’ era.23 Professors Maclin and Thomas have asserted that in many, 
perhaps most, cases the constitutionality of a search or seizure should be judged by reference to 
the Warrant Clause.24 
as seen through a comparison of the various opinions). 
20 Since the mid-1980s the Supreme Court has judged the constitutionality of all civil 
searches under the “special needs” principle, which exempts the government from complying 
with the Warrant Clause and applies constitutional balancing under the Reasonableness Clause.  
See Arcila, supra note 14, at 1228-29; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
652-53 (1995). 
21 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); see also cases listed supra note 18 under 
“Warrant Clause Preference.” 
22 See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43-44, 46-
47 (1969); Amar, Terry & Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 1106-14, 1118-26; Amar, 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 761-71. 
23 See Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10, at 389-400; Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10. 
24 See Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity, supra note 10; Tracey Maclin, The 
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993) [hereinafter 
Maclin, Central Meaning]; George C. Thomas, III, Remapping The Criminal Procedure 
Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1832-34 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Remapping Criminal Procedure].  Thomas has recently suggested a rewriting of the Fourth 
Amendment.  George C. Thomas, III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, And The Framers: James 
Madison Sees The Future And Rewrites The Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451,
1478 (2005) [hereinafter Thomas, Madison Rewrites Fourth Amendment]. 
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At this point, I find the arguments in favor of the Reasonableness Clause approach more 
persuasive.  I will wait until my concluding remarks to briefly expand upon the potentially 
significant implications that my historical analysis has on this debate, as well as on how it may 
actually harmonize our current practice with our history. 
Evidence supporting my conclusion that probable cause sentryship during the Framers’ 
era was at best inconsistent is found in the controversies that inspired the Fourth Amendment, 
and also in sources such as legal doctrine as represented in legal treatises,25 as well as in 
American manuals for justices of the peace (commonly referred to as “justice manuals”),26 
American legal forms, civil search statutes and case law, and the extended development of 
sentryship jurisprudence that we actually experienced.  With regard to the historical 
controversies and the lessons learned from them, Part I(A) will discuss colonial hostility to writs 
of assistance, and Part I(B) will examine the English litigation arising from a disputed search of 
Parliamentarian John Wilkes, which reverberated in the colonies.  Each of those controversies 
focused upon particularity, and thus did not meaningfully engender or advance an understanding 
of probable cause. 
 
25 For convenience, I use the phrase “legal treatise” or the word “treatise” loosely to refer 
to the secondary legal literature, excluding justice of the peace manuals, that was published in 
the Framers’ era.  Technically, this literature covered numerous genres, including but not limited 
to treatises, encyclopedias, commentaries, abridgments, and digests.  See generally ERWIN C. 
SURRENCY, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING (1990) [hereinafter SURRENCY, AMERICAN 
LAW PUBLISHING].  I separately address justice of the peace manuals because of their importance 
to my argument.  See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
26 These justice manuals were aimed at particular colonies or states, or small groups of 
them.  See John A. Conley, Doing It By The Book: Justice Of The Peace Manuals And English 
Law In Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 264 (Figure I), 294-95 
(Bibliography) (1985); Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10, at 280 & n.122; see also 
infra notes 74, 104-105, 118 (citing numerous justice manuals and indicating their geographical 
coverage where not evident from title). 
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Part II contains an analysis of the common law, and explains that, even after the Fourth 
Amendment’s adoption, judges could have felt empowered to issue search warrants without 
acting as probable cause sentries, a state of affairs that lasted throughout the Framers’ era.  This 
explanation consists of several parts.  Part II(A) acknowledges that legal elites may have 
endorsed judicial sentryship given that the concept had been articulated, primarily as legal 
doctrine in learned treatises.  This ethic also was advanced to a lesser extent through English 
case law, and through a bit of American case law as well. 
A detailed study of guidance that likely influenced non-elite lawyers and non-elite judges 
as they actually engaged in search warrant practice follows in Part II(B).  Crucially, both legal 
treatises and most importantly American justice manuals often and expressly stated that a 
judicial sentryship role was merely optional, as explained in Part II(B)(1).  The evidence from 
justice manuals is especially significant because these legal publications likely exerted a 
dominant influence on day-to-day search warrant procedure.  Part II(B)(2) scrutinizes American 
application forms used to obtain search warrants, as well as American search warrant forms 
themselves.  The application forms often did not call for specifying the underlying facts 
supporting a probable cause claim, and the warrant forms were devoid of any meaningful 
evidence that judges monitored probable cause.  Part II(B)(3) presents a plain text argument 
against a judicial sentryship duty during the Framers’ era. 
Part III turns to statutory law to show that judges often did not perceive the law as 
imposing a probable cause sentryship function upon them.  Finally, Part IV notes that, if judicial 
vigilance with respect to probable cause had been understood and implemented during the 
Framers’ era, it is difficult to explain why the Supreme Court found itself having to establish this 
judicial duty as late as 1958. 
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I. THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY FOCUS UPON PARTICULARITY, NOT 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
As we seek to uncover the understanding of probable cause that prevailed during the 
Framers’ era, it is instructive to recognize that aggressive judicial sentryship would have been a 
rather new, novel, and developing concept.  As such, it is significant that, of two controversies 
that were central to fostering the Framers’ desire for constitutional search and seizure 
protections, namely the colonial experience with writs of assistance and the famous John Wilkes 
controversy in England, neither would have engendered a widespread understanding of probable 
cause sentryship.  This is because each of these controversies focused much more strongly upon 
particularity than probable cause. 
 
A. COLONIAL EXPERIENCE WITH WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 
Colonial disputes with royal authorities over writs of assistance are widely accepted to 
have been a contributing cause to the Revolution and, in particular, to the Fourth Amendment’s 
inclusion in the Bill of Rights.27 Writs of assistance “received their name from the fact that they 
commanded all officers and subjects of the Crown to assist in their execution,” and were used to 
perform general searches with the aim of enforcing the customs laws.28 The common law did 
 
27 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978); United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886); Potter 
Stewart, The Road To Mapp v. Ohio And Beyond: The Origins, Development And Future Of The 
Exclusionary Rule In Search-And-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369-71 (1983); 
Thomas, Madison Rewrites Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 1488; O.M. Dickerson, Writs 
Of Assistance As A Cause Of Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) [hereinafter Dickerson, Writs Of Assistance]; see also Scott E. 
Sundby, Protecting The Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” 
And General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 507-08, 537-42 (2004). 
28 NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 53-54 (Leonard W. Levy, ed., Da Capo Press Reprints in 
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not authorize writs, which instead were statutorily created.  Technically, writs did not provide 
any search authority (as opposed to warrants, which do).29 Writs merely purported to require law 
enforcement officers and even bystanders to assist in a search.30 Thus, the search authority that 
writs represented had to emanate from statutory sources.  Both English and colonial customs 
officers claimed a right to search ex officio on the theory that the statutory search authority was 
incorporated into their commissions.31 In the 1760s, however, colonial authorities increasingly 
sought to use writs of assistance to help validate these searches.32 Continued colonial resistance 
to the writs, premised in part upon arguments that the English legislation authorizing writs in 
 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1970)); POLYVOIS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH &
SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL & COMMON LAW 10 (1982); see also William J. Cuddihy, Fourth 
Amendment (Historical Origins), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AM. CONST. 761, 761 (Leonard W. 
Levy et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins)]; Joseph J. 
Stengel, The Background Of The Fourth Amendment To The Constitution Of The United States, 
Part One, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 294 (1969). 
29 See Dickerson, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 27, at 45.  Nonetheless, writs have been 
considered to be a type of general warrant.  See, e.g., POLYVIOU, supra note 28, at 10; Gerard V. 
Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 835 
(1989); Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 561; Osmond Fraenkel, 
Concerning Searches & Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 364 (1920). 
30 See Dickerson, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 27, at 45. 
31 See 3 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 67 (Lawrence S. Mayo ed., 1936); LASSON, supra note 28, at 55 & n.20; 
JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDICATED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1761-1772, at 55 n.15 (1865); 
Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins), supra note 28, at 761; Dickerson, Writs Of 
Assistance, supra note 27, at 45; Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 24, at 219-20. 
32 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 31-32 (1966); LASSON, supra note 28, at 55; Maclin, Central 
Meaning, supra note 24, at 219-21. 
I need to correct the record at this point.  I previously claimed that colonial authorities 
also began using writs of assistance to take advantage of their immunizing effect; in doing so, I 
was equating the immunizing effect of writs and warrants.  See Arcila, supra note 14, at 1237 & 
nn.69-70.  My assertion was overly broad.  Based upon numerous cases, Professor Amar 
suggests that writs and warrants offered differing levels of immunity to the searcher, with writs 
providing immunity only if a successful search had occurred, while warrants extended immunity 
even if a search had been unsuccessful.  Amar, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 10, at 78-80.  
Given that his was the earlier publication, it is particularly unfortunate that I had overlooked 
Amar’s position when I made my assertion. 
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England did not extend to the colonies, resulted in England promulgating the Townshend Act of 
1767, which was intended to formally legalize the writs in the colonies.33 The effort was largely 
unsuccessful, with most colonial judges continuing to resist issuing writs, especially 
unparticularized ones.34 
The writs of assistance controversy probably did not meaningfully advance a judicial 
sentryship ethic regarding probable cause since the disputed issues concentrated on other 
concepts.  Continued colonial resistance to the writs, even after the Townshend Act, was justified 
on several grounds, including objections that the writs were equivalent to general warrants that 
lacked particularity and therefore granted the searcher too much discretion,35 as well as to the 
virtually perpetual nature of the writs.36 
I am unaware of any clear evidence that a lack of probable cause was the animating 
reason behind the refusal to issue any writ.  This point, however, is admittedly a bit fuzzy.37 The 
 
33 See LASSON, supra note 28, at 69-71; M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 1-
2, 239 (1978). 
34 See 2 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1054-84; LASSON, supra note 28, at 
72-76; Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 566-67 & n.26; Joseph R. Frese, 
James Otis And Writs Of Assistance, 30 NEW ENG. Q. 496, 506-07 (1957); Dickerson, Writs Of 
Assistance, supra note 27, at 48-74. 
35 See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 566 & n.26, 581; David E. 
Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar And Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 227, 243-44 (2005). 
36 See generally 2 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1054-84.  The perpetual 
nature of the writs had been a sore point in the colonies even before the Townshend Act.  See 
Sundby, supra note 27, at 540 (reprinting James Otis’s famous 1761 argument against writs, 
which included this grievance). 
37 Colonial America certainly experienced, for instance, calls for a probable cause 
limitation upon searches.  One famous incident involved the 1768 seizure of John Hancock’s 
ship Liberty. See generally HERBERT S. ALLAN, JOHN HANCOCK: PATRIOT IN PURPLE 105-08 
(1953); OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS & THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 238 
(1951); 11 LAWRENCE HENRY GIBSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION–THE 
TRIUMPHANT EMPIRE: THE RUMBLING OF THE COMING STORM, 1766-1770 at 152-53 (1965); 
LASSON, supra note 28, at 72; Andrew P. Peabody, Boston Mobs Before The Revolution, 62
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 321, 326-27 (Sept. 1888).  Hancock participated in a Boston town meeting, 
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reason is that probable cause and particularity are often closely related:  generally, probable 
cause provides the knowledge that makes particularity possible.  As Professor LaFave has 
explained, “the requirement of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement, in 
that—at least under some circumstances—the lack of a more specific description will make it 
apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items 
are to be found in a particular place.”38 Thus, I must acknowledge that some of the refusals to 
issue writs could be perceived as hinging upon a lack of probable cause.  For example, the 
historical record indicates a judicial willingness to issue writs, provided that they were requested 
on oath that reason existed for believing that uncustomed goods were located in a particular 
place.39 It is difficult to parse this standard in relation to whether the primary objection was to a 
lack of particularity, probable cause, or some combined deficiency. 
Nonetheless, the consistent and overarching theme in colonial judicial resistance to the 
writs was to their unparticularized nature, and to the unconstrained discretion they therefore 
afforded a searcher.  A chief justice in Florida, for example, repeatedly refused to issue writs the 
customs house requested, explaining that “I do not think myself justified by Law to issue general 
 
which issued a declaration that the seizure was wrongful, in part because it had lacked “any 
probable cause of seizure that we know of, or indeed any cause that has yet been made known.”  
Petition To Massachusetts Governor Bernard, BOSTON GAZETTE, OR, COUNTRY JOURNAL, June 
20, 1768; Boston Town Meeting Report (June 17, 1768), in A REPORT OF THE RECORD 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, CONTAINING THE BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, 1758 TO 
1769 at 257, 258 (1886); see also W.T. BAXTER, THE HOUSE OF HANCOCK: BUSINESS IN BOSTON 
1724-1775 at 266-67 (1945). 
Similarly, another well-known protest about search power in the colonies under writs of 
assistance complained about an insufficiently demanding suspicion threshold.  A STATE OF THE 
RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (1772), in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1776 at 233, 
243-44 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967).  Samuel Adams generally is credited with authorship of this 
passage.  See id. at 233; Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 602 n.139. 
38 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 4.5 at 562-63 (4th ed. 2004) (citation omitted). 
39 See Dickerson, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 27, at 51, 60 (discussing experience in 
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania). 
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writs  . . . to be lodged in the hands and to be used discretionally . . . at the will of subordinate 
officers.”40 It is on this basis that I claim that the animating objection was to the lack of 
particularity, rather than to a lack of probable cause. 
 
B. THE WILKES CASES FROM ENGLAND 
Moving from writs to warrants we see that the challenged warrants in the English cases 
involving the John Wilkes dispute41 help explain my position.  At the heart of that controversy 
were unparticularized general warrants.  The principal warrant called for a “strict and diligent 
search for the authors printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper intitled [sic] 
The North Briton No. 45.  Saturday April 23. 1763. printed for G. Kearsley in Ludgate-Street 
London.”42 With respect to the search of Wilkes’s home, the objection to this warrant was not 
really that probable cause was lacking.  The court itself declared that probable cause had existed 
for believing that Wilkes was the author.43 What was objectionable was the lack of particularity, 
 
40 Id. at 64. 
41 In 1763, John Wilkes, “a flamboyant member of Parliament,” anonymously published 
a critique of King George III and his ministry in a pamphlet entitled The North Briton Number 
45. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 772 n.54.  Asserting a seditious libel, the 
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued a general warrant against the author and printer, and also 
against several other allegedly seditious publications.  One warrant was specifically directed 
against John Entick as author of The Monitor. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.  
Between 1763 and 1769, Wilkes and about 50 other search targets lodged successful trespass 
actions, with English courts ruling such general warrants void and juries assessing significant 
damages.  See generally LASSON, supra note 28, at 43-49; TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 29-35; 
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 772 n.54; Davies, Original Fourth Amendment,
supra note 10, at 562-63; Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity, supra note 10, at 933 & nn.36, 
38-39.  The Wilkes dispute was highly publicized in the colonies.  See LASSON, supra note 28, at 
45-46; Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 772 n.54; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill Of 
Rights As A Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1176-77 (1991); Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at 563. 
42 Money v. Leach, 3 Burrow 1742, 1747, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 1008, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 1075, 1078 (K.B. 1765) (emphasis original to Burrow reporter). 
43 Lord Chief Justice Pratt indicated that “the evidence . . . plainly sh[o]w, that Mr. 
Wilkes was” the author.  Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153, 1166, 98 Eng. Rep. 
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which resulted in “a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions 
may chance to fall.”44 This empowered the searchers to “rummage[] all the papers together they 
could find,” including all manuscripts and papers in drawers, after which they left with a sack 
they had filled with papers.45 Adding to the insult of the affair was that “Mr. Wilkes’s private 
pocket-book filled up the mouth of the sack.”46 
Similarly, though the probable cause concept is certainly addressed in Money v. Leach 
(which concerned the same warrant)47 and Entick v. Carrington (which involved a different 
warrant that specifically named Entick and a publication entitled The Monitor but otherwise 
lacked particularity),48 it does not appear to have been seriously in dispute.  In the former case, 
the court noted that, after the general warrant had been issued but before the search, an official 
had been informed that Wilkes had been seen going into the house of Leach, who was a printer, 
and also that Leach had printed The North Briton No. 45.49 In the latter case, the court recounted 
that the warrant had been issued upon a written statement from Jonathan Scott, a bookseller and 
publisher, that Entick had been involved in publishing The Monitor.50 
489, 498 (C.P. 1763). 
44 Id., 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1167, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. 
45 Id., 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1156, 98 Eng. Rep. at 491. 
46 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1065 (C.P. 1765).  Different 
versions of this case do not report this same language.  Cf. id., 2 Wilson 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 
(C.P. 1765). 
47 3 Burrow 1742, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765).  The 
principal warrant against Wilkes, which also was at issue in Money v. Leach, is reprinted in 
reports of the latter case.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
48 The warrant against Entick is reproduced in the reports of that case.  Entick v. 
Carrington, 2 Wilson 275, 278-79, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1034, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 810 
(C.P. 1765). 
49 Money v. Leach, 3 Burrow 1742, 1748, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 1009, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 1075, 1079 (K.B. 1765). 
50 Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wilson 275, 277-78, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1033, 95 
Eng. Rep. 807, 809 (C.P. 1765). 
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What was most objectionable about the warrants that were at issue in Money v. Leach and 
Entick v. Carrington was their lack of particularity.  In Money v. Leach, a litigant focused upon 
particularity in arguing that the warrant was invalid. 
[T]he WARRANT itself is illegal. ’Tis against the author, printer and publisher of 
the paper, generally, without naming or describing them; . . . . it is also, “To seize 
his papers;” that is, all his papers. 
 . . . . 
 IF “Author, printer and publisher,” without naming any particular person, 
be sufficient in such a warrant as this is, it would be equally so, to issue a warrant 
generally, “To take up the robber or murderer of such a one.”  This is no 
description of the person; but only of the offence: it is making the officer to be 
judge of the matter, in the place of the person who issues the warrant.  Such a 
power would be extremely mischievous, and might be productive of great 
oppression. 
 . . . . 
 . . . And this is a warrant “To seize ALL a man’s papers,” without any 
particular relation even to the crime they would suppose him chargeable with.51 
In Entick v. Carrington, the court criticized the warrant’s generality, which required that “the 
lock and doors of every room, box, or trunk must be broken open; all the papers and books 
without exception, if the warrant be executed according to its tenor, must be seized and carried 
away.”52 A different reported version of the same case emphasizes the court’s disapproval of the 
discretion that the warrant allowed the officers due to its lack of particularity—“they were to 
seize all papers, bank bills, or any other valuable papers they might take away if they were so 
disposed.”53 
In summary, and as Professor Amsterdam has explained, “the primary abuse thought to 
characterize the general warrants and the writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality, the 
license that they gave to search Everyman without particularized cause, the fact that they were—
 
51 3 Burrow 1742, 1762-63, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 1023-24, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 
1086, 1088 (K.B. 1765) (emphasis original to Burrow reporter). 
52 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1064 (C.P. 1765). 
53 2 Wilson 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765). 
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as Wilkes proclaimed Lord Halifax's warrant for the authors and publishers of No. 45 of the 
North Briton—‘a ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation.’ ”54 
II. POST-INDEPENDENCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON LAW 
A close examination of the historical material shows that it is surprisingly equivocal on 
the issue of whether judges consistently served as probable cause sentries prior to issuing search 
warrants.  To assert that judges in the post-Independence era may not always have monitored 
probable cause is counterintuitive because early American statutes typically conditioned warrants 
upon prior suspicion.55 Nonetheless, in terms of actual common law practice, Cuddihy and at 
least one other prominent scholar believe that the vast majority of judicial officers who issued 
search warrants often did not supervise the application process to ensure that prior suspicion 
validly existed.56 Professor Davies has not opined on this specific issue, though as I will detail in 
a moment he believes that, as a matter of legal doctrine, judges in the Framers’ era were 
expected to fulfill this role.  In terms of formal originalism, it may be that the Framers and other 
legal elites of the period intended for judges to serve as probable cause sentries.  As I 
acknowledge below, major English treatises and a few case decisions certainly articulated a 
probable cause sentryship ethic prior to and during the Framers’ era.  Legal elites of the era 
 
54 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 366 (1974) (emphasis added and citations omitted).  For the internal quotation, Amsterdam 
cites 2 THOMAS E. MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 247 (3d ed. 1889), but it 
was the ninth edition that was published in 1889.  See 2 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 238 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., John Rees 
1989) (2d ed. 1957).  Amsterdam may have intended to cite to the American edition published in 
1864.  See 2 THOMAS E. MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 247 (photo. reprint 
1986) (1864) (published in Boston). 
55 See Arcila, supra note 14, at 1238 n.72. 
56 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1525 (concluding that “judicial sentryship 
against unfounded warrants . . . was . . . the exception”); see also id. at 1192-94, 1199, 1351.  
Professor Sklansky has accepted Cuddihy’s conclusion.  Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1798-99. 
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probably could have accessed and would have studied this material.  But other indicia of 
common law practice, especially materials that non-elite lawyers and non-elite judges likely 
used as they engaged in search warrant procedure on a day-to-day basis, shows that this ethic 
probably was not consistently implemented during the period.  In light of the ambiguity in the 
historical record, I am not yet prepared to take a position about the Framers’ intent on this issue.  
But I do think that indicia concerning how the common law was actually carried out shows that 
Cuddihy is likely correct:  it is quite likely that judges in the Framers’ era often did not engage in 
probable cause sentryship. 
 
A. LEGAL ELITES AND THE CASE IN FAVOR OF JUDICIAL SENTRYSHIP: MAJOR 
TREATISES AND A FEW CASES DID ARTICULATE SUCH A DUTY 
It must be acknowledged that, in the treatises, the extent of guidance suggesting a 
probable cause sentryship role for the judiciary is impressive.  A few cases also suggested such a 
duty.  Professor Davies focuses upon this material in asserting that, as a matter of legal 
doctrine,57 magistrates were “expected to assess the grounds for probable cause of suspicion 
respecting the person to be arrested or the place to be searched.”58 He also asserts that, “like 
modern courts, the Framers understood that the magistrate’s review of the factual allegations 
offered as cause for a search could prevent an unjustified invasion of a house.”59 In support of a 
 
57 Davies’s analysis specifically focuses upon legal doctrine rather than practice.  See 
Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10, at 282 n.124. 
58 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654. 
59 Id. at 589.  If Davies means to argue that the Framers expected judges to perform a 
probable cause sentryship role, he does not provide any direct authority at this point.  He does, 
however, provide a cross-reference to his argument that judges enjoyed discretion to reject 
warrant applications if they did not believe probable cause existed.  Id. at 589 n.103.  I think the 
evidence supporting a lack of judicial discretion, at least on occasion and particularly in the civil 
search context, is better than Davies acknowledges.  See infra Part III. 
Davies does not equate all aspects of originalist and modern warrant standards.  To the 
contrary, he argues that the Framers’ warrant standards were more demanding than modern 
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sentryship role, Davies points to a passage in a dominant English treatise, Hale’s Pleas Of The 
Crown,60 which in the context of arrest warrants provided that a judicial officer is “a competent 
judge of those circumstances, that may induce the granting of a warrant” and that “[t]he party 
that demands it ought to be examind [sic] upon his oath touching the whole matter, whereupon 
the warrant is demanded, and that examination put into writing.”61 
standards.  See infra note 101. 
60 Hale was probably the preeminent legal scholar of his day.  See 6 WILLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 580-81, 594-95 (1977).  “Ever since its first 
publication,” Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown was “regarded as a book of the highest authority.”  Id. 
at 590. 
Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown, though generally not considered to be the most influential in 
the new nation, probably did play that role with regard to search warrant procedure.  See, e.g., 
infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.  Blackstone’s treatise is considered to have been the 
most influential in America during the Framers’ era.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (2d ed. 1985); SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 25, 
at 132-33; Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 580 n.78; Sklansky, supra note 
9, at 1778 & n.240; Edwin C. Surrency, The Beginnings Of American Legal Literature, 31 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 207, 216 (1987) [hereinafter Surrency, American Legal Literature].  Blackstone’s 
popularity, however, “began to cool” after the Revolution because he was considered to be “too 
ardent a Royalist.”  Howard Schweber, Before Langdell: The Roots Of American Legal Science,
in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY 
SOURCES 606, 612-13 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).  More importantly, Blackstone’s treatise did 
not include any discussion of search warrants (though it did discuss arrest warrants).  Davies, 
Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 580 n.78.  Hale’s treatise, as well as Hawkins’s, 
provided greater detail concerning criminal procedure in general, including of search warrants.  
Id. 
61 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297 (citing 2 SIR 
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 110-11 (photo. reprint 1971) 
(Sollom Emlyn ed., 1736) [hereinafter HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736]).  Davies also has 
acknowledged Hale’s instruction (again referring to arrest rather than search warrants) that “ ‘it 
is fit in all cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much more for suspicion of felony, [for the 
justice of the peace] to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well whether a felony 
were done, as also the causes of his suspicion.’ ”  Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra 
note 10, at 652 n.290 (citing 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, supra, at 110).  Another 
passage from Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown that makes a similar point, once again in the context of 
discussing arrests, is that: 
 
justices of peace are made judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion, and 
when they have examined the party accusing touching the reasons of their 
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Davies additionally relies upon other contemporary English sources that likewise give 
similar guidance in the context of discussing arrest rather than search warrants, including 
Blackstone’s and Hawkins’s treatises.  Davies relies upon Blackstone’s guidance that: 
it is fitting [for the magistrate who hears a warrant application] to examine upon 
oath the party requiring a warrant [i.e., the complainant], as well to ascertain that 
there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without which no warrant 
should be granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of suspecting the 
party, against whom the warrant is prayed.62 
This language was reiterated in at least one American justice manual.63 Davies also cites 
Hawkins’s passage that: 
a Justice of Peace cannot well be too tender in [issuing arrest warrants prior to 
indictment], and seems to be punishable not only at the Suit of the King, but also 
of the Party grieved; if he grant any such Warrant groundlessly and maliciously, 
without such a probable Cause, as might induce a candid and impartial Man to 
suspect the Party to be guilty.64 
suspicion, if they find the causes of suspicion to be reasonable, it is now become 
the justice’s suspicion as well as theirs. 
2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 79 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 
1800) [hereinafter HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800]; 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, 
supra, at 79. 
62 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297 (citing 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 287 (1769, reprinted facsimile The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE]). 
63 2 RICHARD BACHE, THE MANUAL OF A PENNSYLVANIA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 138 
(1810) (citing Blackstone). 
64 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297 (citing 2 WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 84-85 (1721) [hereinafter HAWKINS 
1721]).  Davies also cites to the same passage in a later edition.  Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297 (citing 2 SERJEANT WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135-36 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1787) [hereinafter HAWKINS 
1787]).  Davies describes Hawkins as “the leading eighteenth-century authority on criminal 
procedure.”  Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 579; see also id. at 579 n.76 
(citing 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 361-62 (1938)). 
Note that the passage quoted in the text actually suggests judicial liability for failing to 
engage in judicial sentryship.  I address below the implications this has for my argument.  See 
infra note 98. 
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In addition to English treatises, Davies also relies upon English cases that formed part of 
the Wilkes dispute, and which were well known in America.65 As Davies points out,66 Lord 
Camden stated in Entick v. Carrington that, before a search warrant is issued, “the justice and the 
informer must proceed with great caution; there must be an oath that the party has had his goods 
stolen, and a strong reason to believe they are concealed in such a place.”67 Davies also notes68 
that, in Money v. Leach, Lord Mansfield said, “[i]t is not fit, that the receiving or judging of the 
information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and 
should give certain directions to the officer.  This is so, upon reason and convenience.”69 
Davies could have added more to all this evidence.  The lesson that the author of the 
Canadian Freeholder took from Wilkes v. Wood70 was that “the business of a judicial officer, or 
magistrate” is to “exercise an act of judgment of an high nature,” which “ought not” be done 
 
65 Regarding the Wilkes dispute, see supra Part I(B). 
66 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297. 
67 2 Wilson 275, 291-92, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765).  A different, more detailed 
version of the case does not contain this specific language.  The analogous passage in the more 
detailed reporter states:  “[o]bserve too the caution with which the law proceeds in this singular 
case.—There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed.—The owner must swear that 
the good are lodged in such a place.”  19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1067 (C.P. 1765). 
68 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 654 n.297. 
69 3 Burrow 1742, 1766, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 1027, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088 
(K.B. 1765) (emphasis original to Burrow reporter). 
Another major English case to the same effect was Cooper v. Boot, 4 Douglas 339, 99 
Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785), though it may have had little influence during the Framers’ era.  
Lord Mansfield declared in dicta, but on behalf of the court, that “[a] duty is also imposed on 
such commissioner or magistrate to exercise his judgment on the grounds of suspicion so laid 
before him, and if he thinks them sufficient, and not otherwise, he is bound to grant a warrant to 
search.”  Cooper v. Boot, 4 Douglas 339, 348, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916 (K.B. 1785); accord 
Cooper v. Booth, 3 Espinasse 135, 144, 170 Eng. Rep. 564, 568 (K.B. 1785) (different reported 
version of same case).  Along the same lines, he also asserted that “[i]f the magistrate thinks 
there is sufficient ground, he is bound to grant the warrant; if insufficient, to refuse it.”  4 
Douglas at 349, 99 Eng. Rep. at 916; accord 3 Espinasse at 147, 170 Eng. Rep. at 568.  Cooper,
however, may not have been widely known in America during the Framers’ era.  See infra note 
167 and accompanying text. 
70 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). 
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“without having received an information upon oath from some credible witness.”71 Additionally, 
in a pre-constitutional American case, Connecticut’s highest court declared in Frisbie v. Butler 
that “it is the duty of a Justice of the Peace granting a search warrant . . . to limit the search to 
such particular place or places, as he, from the circumstances, shall judge there is reason to 
suspect.”72 
American legal publications followed the lead of the English treatises, and in particular 
Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown. Dane’s influential abridgment instructed that: 
as to some facts the process and proceedings are upon suspicion, but this 
suspicion ought to be carefully examined and cautiously admitted by the 
magistrate, otherwise it may be made an engine of malice and ill will; but as 
search warrants are of public convenience they are admitted in the English and 
our law, under the following cautions and restrictions:  1. They ought to be made 
on oath that a felony is committed:  2. That the complainant has probable cause to 
suspect that they are in such a house or place:  3. That he doth suspect &c.:  
4. Sh[o]ws the reasons of such suspicion . . . .73 
71 19 Howell’s State Trials 1168, 1169-70 (1813). 
72 1 Kirby 213, 215 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787). 
73 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 245 § 2 
n.* (1824) [hereinafter 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824] (emphasis added); see also 7
DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra note 73, at 247 § 4 (explaining that “good and 
certain cause ought to be found in the complaint” submitted in support of warrant).  Davies cites 
Dane’s abridgment in support of his position.  Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 
10, at 654 n.297 (citing 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra, at 243).  Though Davies 
cites to page 243 of Dane’s abridgment, there is no discussion there concerning the judicial role 
in monitoring probable cause.  Most likely Davies meant to cite to pages 244-45, section two, 
note *, where the topic is addressed. 
Dane’s was the first influential American abridgment having a broad scope and “had a 
tremendous impact on American law judging from references to it.”  SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW 
PUBLISHING, supra note 25, at 113; see also WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE 
ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 35 (1994) (referring to Dane’s “great 
Abridgment”); A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise And Fall Of The Legal Treatise: Legal Principles And 
The Forms Of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 669-70 (1981); Surrency, American 
Legal Literature, supra note 60, at 219; cf. SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 
25, at 134-35 (noting that “[t]he work was extremely important, but failed to leave a lasting 
effect on American law,” but also that it was sufficiently successful that Dane used royalties 
from it “to found [a] professorship at Harvard Law School”).  Dane’s abridgment was 
particularly important because it was apparently the only attempt during the Framers’ era to 
summarize American law.  See SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 25, at 113. 
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Dane’s formulation, that a search warrant applicant should “show the reasons of his suspicion,” 
is the most commonly used in American legal literature during the Framers’ era.74 Also 
regularly used in American justice manuals was that the applicant should “assign[]” before a 
judge his “suspicion, and the probable cause thereof” because search warrants should be granted 
only “upon the examination of the fact.”75 
74 American legal literature commonly stated that a judge “may grant a warrant to search” 
if an applicant “shows the reasons” or “shows the cause” of his suspicions, or some other similar 
formulation.  E.g., RICHARD BURN, BURN’S ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 357 
(Eliphat Ladd ed., 1792) (printed in New Hampshire) [hereinafter BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE 
ABRIDGMENT 1792]; RICHARD BURN, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND 
PARISH OFFICER 323 (Joseph Greenleaf ed., 1773) [hereinafter BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 
ABRIDGMENT 1773] (printed in Boston); DANIEL DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE 
AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 46 (1824) 
[hereinafter DAVIS, TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824] (printed in Massachusetts); JOHN A. DUNLAP,
THE NEW-YORK JUSTICE 368 (1815) [hereinafter DUNLAP, THE NEW-YORK JUSTICE 1815]; 
JAMES EWING, A TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 505 (1805) 
[hereinafter EWING, TREATISE ON JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 1805] (adopted to New Jersey law); 
JOHN FAUCHERAUD GRIMKE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 398 (3d ed. 1810) 
[hereinafter GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 1810]; WILLIAM WALLER HENING,
THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 621 (3d ed. 1820) [hereinafter HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 
1820]; WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 413 (1799) [hereinafter HENING,
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799]; WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 402 
(1795) [hereinafter HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795]; HENRY HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 407 (1822) [hereinafter HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE 1822]; A 
NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: BEING A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO THE DUTY AND 
OFFICE OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 404 (1803) [hereinafter NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR 
JUSTICES 1803] (adopted to New York law); JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR,
THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 315 (Mathew Carey ed., 1801) 
[hereinafter PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801] (printed in 
Philadelphia); HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 273 (1816) 
[hereinafter POTTER, THE NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE 1816] (adopted to North Carolina law). 
75 E.g., BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 323; 
GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 1810, supra note 74, at 398; HENING, NEW 
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1820, supra note 74, at 621; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, supra note 
74, at 413; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795, supra note 74, at 402; HITCHCOCK, THE 
ALABAMA JUSTICE 1822, supra note 74, at 407; PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES 
OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 315. 
Other substantively similar formulations also appeared.  E.g., BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE 
ABRIDGMENT 1792, supra note 74, at 417 (“It is necessary, that the party who demands the 
warrant be first examined on oath, touching the whole matter whereupon the warrant is 
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In support of these propositions, these American works uniformly relied upon Hale’s 
Pleas Of The Crown, which evidences how influential that English work was on American 
search warrant procedure.76 Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown indeed stated that search warrants for 
stolen goods were “not to be granted” unless “the party complaining hath probable cause to 
suspect they are in such a house or place, and do sh[o]w his reasons of such suspicion.”77 It also 
similarly instructed that the only legal search warrants were those “where the party assigns 
before the justice his suspicion and the probable cause thereof,”78 and emphasized that search 
warrants were “judicial acts” and therefore “must be granted upon examination of the fact.”79 
demanded.”); HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, supra note 74, at 462 (“warrants for felony, 
may be granted by a justice of the peace on probable grounds of suspicion:—Yet that they should 
be well satisfied of the reasonableness of the accusation”). 
76 For a brief discussion of Hale’s influence in American law, see supra note 60. 
77 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 150; 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 150; accord 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 
61, at 113; 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 113.  The full passage from 
Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown is presented infra note 126.  Of the 13 American justice manuals 
cited supra notes 74-75, every one of them cited to Hale’s volume 2, page 150 in support, and 
sometimes to page 113 as well. 
78 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 150; 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 150. 
Davies himself recites Hale’s passage that a complainant must “show the reasons of his 
suspicion,” though he does so while addressing issues other than whether judges served as 
probable cause sentries.  See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 651 n.289, 
703 n.447. 
79 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 150; 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 150. 
Additionally, a few American justice manuals repeated Hale’s arrest guidance suggesting 
that justices were to examine the accusing party because justices “are . . . judges of the 
reasonableness of the suspicion.”  E.g., BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE ABRIDGMENT 1792, supra 
note 74, at 418; BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 372; 
PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 360; cf. 
supra note 61 (citing 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 79, and 2 HALE’S
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 79, and reciting relevant language).  A few also 
repeated Hawkins’s guidance that justices “cannot well be too tender” in issuing arrest warrants 
lest they be held liable for granting “any such warrant groundlessly and maliciously, without . . . 
probable cause.”  E.g., BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE ABRIDGMENT 1792, supra note 74, at 419; 
BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 373; PARKER, CONDUCTOR 
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The authorities discussed above undeniably constitute an impressive litany of doctrinal 
evidence in favor of judicial sentryship of probable cause.  Yet, as I will explain below, there are 
numerous reasons to question whether the non-elite judges who were actually charged with 
issuing search warrants would have followed this guidance. 
 
B. NON-ELITE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL 
SENTRYSHIP 
In spite of the guidance emanating from many elite legal sources, abundant reasons exist 
to believe that the non-elite legal workhorses who actually engaged in search warrant practice 
may not have followed it.  Most importantly, treatises and American justice manuals often and 
explicitly stated that judicial sentryship of probable cause during the warrant application process 
was merely optional.  Additionally, the legal forms that non-elite members of the legal 
profession and judiciary quite likely would have used as guides for search warrant procedure 
provide reasons for doubting that non-elite judges engaged in probable cause sentryship.  Lastly, 
a plain text analysis of the weak language used to describe the duty, as well as consideration of 
the changes that have occurred in language since the Framers’ era, also call into doubt whether 
the judiciary consistently monitored probable cause. 
 
1. Treatises And American Justice Manuals Explicitly Stated That Judicial 
Sentryship Was Merely Optional 
Treatises and American justice manuals from the Framers’ era easily could have led 
justices of the peace to believe that a sentryship role was at most optional. This is because some 
guidance in these authorities clearly supports the view that, during the pre-issuance process, 
 
GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 360; cf. supra note 64 and 
accompanying text (citing and reciting Hawkins’s language). 
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judicial vigilance in monitoring the adequacy of probable cause was not obligatory. At least 
seven American justice manuals from the Framers’ era stated, in sections devoted to arrests, that 
it was convenient but not always necessary for judges to engage in the probable cause sentryship 
role.80 Six of these included this guidance at the same time as they elsewhere suggested a 
sentryship role.81 Inclusion of these apparently contradictory guidelines in the same works is 
significant because the most ready means to reconcile them is to treat the sentryship role as 
 
80 BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 372 (“It is 
convenient, though not always necessary, that the party who demands the warrant be first 
examined on oath, touching the whole matter whereupon the warrant is demanded, and that 
examination put into writing.”) (emphasis added); GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 
1810, supra note 74, at 479 (same); HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1820, supra note 74, at 699 
(same); HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, supra note 74, at 462 (same); HENING, NEW 
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795, supra note 74, at 450 (same); PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 359-60 (same); RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE 
AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 351 (1774) [hereinafter STARKE, JUSTICE OF PEACE 
1774] (printed in Virginia) (“It is convenient, though not always necessary, that the Party 
demanding a warrant be first examined on Oath.”) (emphasis added). 
Obviously, I believe the natural, plain text meaning of these words amounts to an 
optional sentryship role.  I am sure there is room for others to disagree, though I have not yet 
seen evidence that would persuade me that I am wrong in my interpretation.  Importantly, I think 
any disagreement would probably be only a matter of degree.  I do not see how this language 
could be interpreted as anything other than authorization for Framing-era judges to avoid a 
sentryship role.  Even if one applied a more restrictive interpretation than I do—for example, that 
this was an exception limited to rare cases—this is still an acknowledgement that warrants could 
issue in the Framers’ era without judges independently assessing probable cause, which is still a 
significant departure from modern search warrant practice. 
81 The discrepancy existed both between the search warrant and arrest sections of the 
same work, compare supra note 80 with supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (STARKE,
JUSTICE OF PEACE 1774, supra note 80, is the one exception that appears to have included the 
convenient-but-not-necessary guidance without elsewhere suggesting a sentryship role), as well 
as within the arrest sections of the same work, with contradictory guidance (such as “justices are 
judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion” or that justices “should be well satisfied of the 
reasonableness of the accusation” before granting “warrants for felony . . . on probable grounds 
of suspicion”) often appearing a mere paragraph or two away, and sometimes on the very same 
page, cf. BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 372; GRIMKE,
SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 1810, supra note 74, at 480; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA 
JUSTICE 1820, supra note 74, at 700; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, supra note 74, at 
462; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795, supra note 74, at 450; PARKER, CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 360. 
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optional—consistent with a plain text analysis below82—rather than mandatory.  Additionally, 
all six of these American justice manuals relied upon Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown. It also 
contained the convenient-but-not-necessary language, including in a version published about a 
decade after the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, as well as in the first American edition 
published in 1847!83 The highly influential Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown84 thereby similarly 
indicated that a sentryship role was optional.  So did other English treatises.85 All of this is 
extremely significant given limitations at the time on legal research86 and American judicial 
 
82 See infra Part II(B)(3). 
83 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 582 (1st Am. ed., 
1847) (“It is convenient, tho not always necessary, to take an information upon oath of the 
person that desires the warrant, that a felony was committed, that he doth suspect or know J. S. to 
be the felon; and if suspected, then to set down the causes of his suspicion.”); 1 HALE’S PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 582 (same); 1 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, supra 
note 61, at 582 (same). 
84 For a discussion of the influence that Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown had in America, see 
supra notes 60, 76-77 and accompanying text. 
85 This guidance repeatedly appeared in the English version of Richard Burn’s justice 
manual, both before the Fourth Amendment’s adoption and after it.  E.g., 2 RICHARD BURN &
JOHN BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 389 (18th ed. 1793); 2 RICHARD 
BURN & JOHN BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 389 (16th ed. 1788); 4 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 367 (15th ed. 1785); 2 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 381 (14th ed. 1780); 2 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 340 (13th ed. 1776); 2 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 332 (12th ed. 1772); 4 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 329 (11th ed. 1770); 4 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 272 (10th ed. 1766); 2 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 553 (8th ed. 1764); 3 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 444 (7th ed. 1762); 3 
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 427 (6th ed. 1758); RICHARD 
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 725 (3d ed. 1756); 2 RICHARD BURN,
THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 547 (2d ed. 1756); 2 RICHARD BURN, THE 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 508 (1755).  It also appeared in another English 
treatise.  THOMAS PEARCE, THE COMPLEAT JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 219 
(1756). 
86 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 33, 102; J.L. High, What Shall Be Done With The 
Reports?, 16 AM. L. REV. 429, 430 (1882); Craig Joyce, The Rise Of The Supreme Court 
Reporter: An Institutional Perspective On Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 
1297 (1985).  In the Framers’ era there was a “relative paucity of books,” publication of case 
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training.87 In light of these limitations, American justices of the peace probably relied heavily 
upon these American justice manuals,88 and to a lesser extent upon English treatises,89 when 
looking into something like search warrant procedure in the new nation.  Judges who followed 
this convenient-but-not-necessary guidance often would have felt justified in not monitoring 
probable cause at all prior to issuing warrants.
One possible objection to my argument is that I have not been careful enough in my 
reading of the American justice manuals or Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown. This objection 
emphasizes that the American justice manuals that include the convenient-but-not-necessary 
guidance do so only while discussing warrants in the arrest context.  In doing so, these American 
 
reports was modest, and no really effective organizing system for them existed until West’s key 
number system was devised in the last quarter of the 1800s.  Robert C. Berring, Collapse Of The 
Structure Of The Legal Research Universe: The Imperative Of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. 
REV. 9, 20-22 (1994); Thomas A. Woxland, “Forever Associated With The Practice Of Law”: 
The Early Years Of The West Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REF. SERVS. Q. 115, 116, 118-20 
(Spring 1985). 
87 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 125-26; ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
COMMON LAW 113 (1921); see also infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (regarding lax 
legal training and low barriers to entry into legal profession). 
88 See SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 25, at 131; Davies, Fictional 
Originalism, supra note 10, at 280; see generally Conley, supra note 26.  Conley opines that 
“unlike their English counterparts who had access to a multitude of different law books on a 
variety of topics for reference, the American justices [of the peace] relied on their manual as 
their primary source of legal reference.”  Conley, supra note 26, at 265. 
The importance of these justice manuals and the guidance they provided on warrant 
procedure can also be demonstrated by comparison to commonplace books and their consistent 
lack of guidance on the subject.  In the Framers’ era, legal training, combined with the difficulty 
of conducting legal research, encouraged the personal production and use of “commonplace 
books.”  These were notebooks into which lawyers-in-training, as well as lawyers and even 
judges, entered “points of law found in any source,” including from first-hand courtroom 
observation.  See PAUL M. PRUITT, JR. & DAVID I. DURHAM, COMMONPLACE BOOKS OF LAW: A
SELECTION OF LAW-RELATED NOTEBOOKS FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE MID-
TWENTIETH CENTURY 5-10 (2005); Surrency, American Legal Literature, supra note 60, at 214.  
I have examined numerous commonplace books, and have yet to find any addressing arrest or 
search and seizure law in general, or warrant procedures specifically. 
89 See SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 25, at 165; GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 299 n.66 (1969); Joyce, supra 
note 86, at 1297. 
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works were following the same convention used in Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown, which also 
included the convenient-but-not-necessary guidance only in a chapter devoted to arrests.  The 
more directly applicable search warrant sections of all these works did indicate a sentryship 
role.90 This objection asserts that judges presented with a search warrant application would have 
sought guidance from the search warrant sections of these works, and followed the instructions 
therein that suggested a probable cause sentryship role, while ignoring the contrary guidance 
from the arrest sections.  The premise of this objection is that a sharp distinction would have 
been made during the Framers’ era between the law applicable to arrest warrants versus search 
warrants. 
This objection falters because its premise is flawed.  It is certainly true that some 
differences existed in the common law applicable to arrests versus searches.  But, with respect to 
the probable cause sentryship issue, I can discern no reason why the law applicable to warrants 
would have differed depending upon whether an arrest or search was at issue.  After all, the 
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause imposes the same probable cause requirement upon both 
arrest and search warrants.91 This suggests that during the Framers’ era no sentryship distinction 
would have been drawn between the procedural guidance applicable to warrants irrespective of 
whether it originated in the arrest or search portions of a legal text.92 
90 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
91 I make this point at a high level of abstraction, while cognizant that in specific 
circumstances probable cause is not always treated similarly in the arrest versus search warrant 
context.  See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432 n.5 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“The probable cause to support issuance of an arrest warrant normally would not 
grow stale as easily as that which supports a warrant to search a particular place for particular 
objects.”). 
92 Commentators on this manuscript raised several reasons why probable cause sentryship 
may have differed in arrest and search warrant procedure, but I find these reasons unconvincing. 
One suggestion was that delay was a concern in the arrest context because felons could 
flee prior to being apprehended, but not a concern in the search context since contraband cannot 
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A litigant’s argument in Money v. Leach93 provides some support for this view.  It was 
part of the famous Wilkes dispute, and as such was very well known.94 The plaintiff challenged 
a search and seizure (not an arrest), arguing in part that no oath supported the warrant.  
Defendants’ answer to the charge was that “there was no occasion . . . for it [i.e., the oath].”95 
What was the authority for this defense of the search? The defendants supported their argument 
with the same convenient-but-not-necessary guidance from an arrest chapter in Hale’s Pleas Of 
The Crown, arguing “it is laid down, that ‘it is convenient, though not always necessary to take 
an information upon oath of the person that desires the warrant.’ ”96 At a minimum, this 
 
run away.  This suggestion fails to account for the consistent governmental concern, both in the 
Framers’ era and in more contemporary cases, that contraband might be removed prior to 
execution of a warrant.  See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.  My position might be 
criticized as failing to draw a necessary distinction between customs and regulatory searches 
(where delay was a noted concern in the Framers’ era) and searches for stolen goods.  But I 
doubt this is a sufficient distinction upon which to justify categorically different sentryship duties 
in arrest versus search warrant procedure, particularly given that customs search warrants were 
issued in the same manner as warrants for stolen goods.  See infra note 118. 
Another suggestion was that in the Framers’ time the popular concern was with the 
government’s search power, whereas the government’s arrest power was generally not 
controversial, thus justifying more stringent sentryship in search warrant procedures than in the 
arrest context.  I cannot fully discount this suggestion, though the argument I make immediately 
below regarding Money v. Leach offers some evidence against it.  See infra notes 93-97 and 
accompanying text. 
93 3 Burrow 1742, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765). 
94 See supra notes 41, 47.  The Burrow reporter published Money v. Leach in 1771.  See 1
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 294, entry 20 (W. Harold 
Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., John Rees 1989) (2d ed. 1955).  Blackstone and Hawkins 
briefly referred to the case in their treatises.  See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at 288 n.i; 2 
HAWKINS 1787, supra note 64, at 131 n.2, 138 n.7.  The case also was discussed and cited in 
American cases and treatises.  E.g., Wells v. Jackson, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 458 (1811); DAVIS,
TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824, supra note 74, at 47.  Additionally, and as Professor Davies has 
noted, a portion of the case was reported in English and colonial newspapers.  Davies, Original 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 564 n.22 (citing BOSTON GAZETTE, OR, COUNTRY 
JOURNAL, Mar. 26, 1764, at 2, cols. 2-3, and LONDON CHRON., Dec. 10-13, 1763 (no. 1084), at 
562, col. 2).  As such, chances are high that the legal community during the Framer’s era would 
have been familiar with this decision. 
95 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1025, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1087. 
96 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1025 (citing “1 Hale P.C. 582”), 97 Eng. Rep. at 1087 
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represents an instance in which a lawyer did not draw a distinction concerning warrant 
procedures depending upon whether an arrest or search power was at issue.97 My guess is that it 
would not have been much of a stretch for a justice of the peace to similarly equate the 
sentryship duty in the search and arrest contexts and, after finding the convenient-but-not-
necessary language in an American justice manual (or even in Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown itself, 
though that would have been less likely), to conclude that a probable cause sentryship role was at 
most optional in the search context, rather than mandatory.98 
2. Legal Forms Often Implied That Judicial Sentryship Was Optional 
Continuing to focus upon justices of the peace, the legal workhorses who actually issued 
search warrants, rather than upon legal elites like the Framers leads to more reasons for doubting 
that aggressive sentryship of probable cause was the norm.  Justices of the peace may not have 
had ready access to major treatises.  Rather, it is much more likely that they heavily relied upon 
 
(quoting “1 Hale H. P.C. 582”); cf. supra note 83 (quoting convenient-but-not-necessary 
guidance from same citation to Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown). 
97 One commentator on this manuscript questioned the importance of this point, asserting 
that it was more important that the court ruled against the defendants.  This objection does not 
persuade me because it is overbroad.  There was no ruling on the specific issue I am addressing 
here, and the nature of the case was such that the court could have ruled against the defendants 
while at the same time agreeing with defense counsel that no sentryship distinction existed 
between search and arrest warrant procedures. 
98 Some who are resistant to my view about lax judicial sentryship during the Framers’ 
era may rely upon Hawkins’s suggestion that judges could be held liable for issuing warrants 
upon less than probable cause.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also 2 HAWKINS 
1787, supra note 64, at 132 (“however the justice himself may be punishable for granting such a 
warrant without sufficient grounds, it is reasonable that he alone be answerable for it”).  I agree 
that Hawkins’s guidance is potentially troublesome.  It does not, however, carry the day with me 
for several reasons.  First, it does not appear to be included in other major leading treatises of the 
era.  Second, I am not aware of any evidence that judges ever had such an action brought against 
them, much less that such an action had ever been successful.  As such, I doubt the validity of 
Hawkins’s guidance on this point. 
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justice of the peace manuals.99 Two types of legal forms in these manuals provide reasons for 
believing that, during the Framers’ era, justice of the peace did not necessarily engage in 
probable cause sentryship as part of established search warrant procedure.  The first are the 
forms that applicants provided to the court in support of requests for the issuance of a search 
warrant.  The second are the search warrants themselves. 
 
a. Application Forms For Search Warrants 
According to Cuddihy, in the time period around 1789, when the Constitution was 
adopted and two years before the Fourth Amendment became effective:100 
[l]egal treatises, pamphlets, and statutes explicated the usual protocol in detail.  In 
that protocol, the magistrate issued a warrant upon sworn complaint by an 
informant that he had grounds to suspect, not believe, that an infraction had 
occurred.  That the magistrate should intrude as a civil libertarian overseer was 
not widely assumed.101 
Cuddihy believes that the application forms that were used to request search warrants usually 
required only a general, sworn assertion of suspicion, without requiring that the applicant specify 
 
99 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
100 The Constitution was written in 1787 but did not become effective until 1789.  See 1
U.S.C. at lvii n.1 (2000 ed.) (2001).  The process of adopting the Bill of Rights was completed 
on December 15, 1791 with Virginia’s ratification.  COMM’N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, 1791-1991 at 7 (Herbert M. 
Atherton & J. Jackson Barlow eds., 1991); see also 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1201-02 (1971). 
101 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1525 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
1187, 1192 (addressing the earlier period of 1762-1775, Cuddihy similarly concluded that “[t]he 
general rule was that magistrates neither examined complaints independently to determine their 
adequacy for warrants nor withheld warrants if the assessment was negative”). 
Professor Davies disagrees with Cuddihy’s apparent assertion in the quoted passage that 
suspicion was sufficient to obtain a warrant under the common law in the Framers’ time.  Davies 
has explained that, as a matter of legal doctrine, arrest and search warrants were to issue under 
the common law only upon (1) a sworn allegation that a crime actually had been committed “in 
fact,” rather than upon mere probable cause to believe one had been committed, and (2) probable 
cause of suspicion as to either who committed the crime or where the stolen property was 
located.  See Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10, at 368-73. 
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the factual grounds supporting the claimed suspicion.102 Improved research resources since 
Cuddihy’s study indicate that the evidence is more equivocal than he recognized, though his 
conclusion appears generally correct.103 
In the Framers’ era, American search warrant request forms typically called upon the 
applicant to affirm, in general terms, that he had suspicion.  Though sometimes they also called 
upon the applicant to specify the underlying factual grounds supporting such suspicion,104 just as 
often (if not more often) they did not.105 
102 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1525-27; see also id. at 1192-94 (citing 
numerous pre-Revolutionary sources). 
103 In conducting research for this article, I benefited from an advantage that Cuddihy did 
not enjoy:  text-searchable digitized databases of historic legal texts.  Two such databases, which 
the publisher Thomson-Gale offers on a subscription basis, greatly aided my research.  One is the 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online database, which makes available significant legal titles 
from the eighteenth century.  See http://www.gale.com/EighteenthCentury.  Another is the 
Making Of Modern Law database, which covers legal titles from 1800-1926.  See 
http://www.gale.com/ModernLaw.  These databases are available through some law libraries, 
such as those of Touro Law Center (which recently began subscribing to the latter) and Fordham 
University Law School (which subscribes to both). 
104 See, e.g., Form Of A Complaint To Obtain A Search Warrant, in THE ATTORNEY’S
COMPANION 435 (1818) [hereinafter ATTORNEY’S COMPANION: NEW-YORK 1818] (adopted to 
New York law) (calling upon applicant to “set forth the grounds of suspicion, that they may 
appear to be reasonable”); Form Of A Complaint To Obtain A Search Warrant, in THE CLERK’S
ASSISTANT 236 (1805) [hereinafter CLERK’S ASSISTANT 1805] (“Calculated For The Use Of The 
Citizens Of The United States”) (same); Form Of A Complaint To Obtain A Search Warrant, in 
DAVIS, TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824, supra note 74, at 239 (same); Form Of A Complaint In 
Order To Obtain A Search Warrant, in EWING, TREATISE ON JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 1805, supra 
note 74, at 506-07 (same); Form Of A Complaint In Order To Obtain A Search Warrant, in NEW 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES 1803, supra note 74, at 405-06 (same). 
105 See, e.g., A Search Warrant, With The C[o]mplaint, in BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE 
ABRIDGMENT 1792, supra note 74, at 468-69 (requiring of applicant only general declaration that 
he “hath probable cause to suspect, and doth suspect,” without calling for specification of 
underlying factual grounds supporting suspicion); Complaint For A Search Warrant, in 7
DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra note 73, at 244 § 2 n.* (same); Complaint On 
Theft, And Request For A Warrant To Search, in SAMUEL FREEMAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS 
JUSTICE 167 (1802) [hereinafter FREEMAN, MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 1802] (same); Complaint 
On Theft, And Request For A Warrant To Search, in SAMUEL FREEMAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS 
JUSTICE 153 (1795) [hereinafter FREEMAN, MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 1795] (same); Complaint 
That Property Has Been Stolen, And Prayer For A Warrant To Search Therefor, in JEREMIAH 
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The prevalence of legal forms that failed to demand the details underlying a probable 
cause claim is crucial because legal forms likely dominated search warrant practice.  Given the 
often rudimentary legal training lawyers received in the period,106 and the low barriers to entry 
into the profession,107 there is every reason to believe that lawyers heavily relied upon these legal 
forms.108 Extensive judicial reliance is also likely given the restricted nature of legal research in 
the decades following Independence,109 and that American judges from the period could often 
lack meaningful legal training.110 These are important points because it is likely that all those 
who would have been engaged in the quotidian legal machinery of search warrant application 
and issuance—the lawyers and others who might have applied for search warrants, as well as the 
justices of the peace to whom they applied—would not have been the elites of the legal 
profession.111 
PERLEY, THE MAINE JUSTICE 264 (1823) [hereinafter PERLEY, MAINE JUSTICE 1823] (same); see 
also Form Of A Complaint And Search Warrant, To Search For Counterfeit Money And 
Securities, in DAVIS, TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824, supra note 74, at 217-18 (“has reasonable 
cause to suspect and doth suspect”); A Complaint And Warrant To Search For Stolen Goods, in 
THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, THE AMERICAN CLERK’S COMPANION, AND ATTORNEY’S PROMPTER 284 
(1815) [hereinafter FESSENDEN, AMERICAN CLERK’S COMPANION 1815] (printed in Vermont) 
(“hath good reason to suspect, and doth suspect”). 
It is quite striking that these application forms apparently were considered adequate 
though others of that period, cited supra note 104, called for specifying the underlying facts.  It is 
also remarkable that the conclusory formulation these forms used (“hath probable cause to 
suspect, and doth suspect”), which called for mere assertions that probable cause existed, 
remained acceptable well into the last century.  See infra note 180 and accompanying text; see 
also infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. 
106 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 318-19; LAPIANA, supra note 73, at 38. 
107 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 304-09, 315-18. 
108 See SURRENCY, AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING, supra note 25, at 138 (lawyers found it 
convenient to use legal forms); Surrency, American Legal Literature, supra note 60, 207 (noting 
that “[t]he sale of . .  legal forms was a large part of the printer’s business”). 
109 See supra notes 86, 88. 
110 See supra note 87. 
111 Professor LaPiana hints at this point when he writes, in the context of discussing early 
efforts to limit entry into the legal profession, that: 
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In trying to identify the state of common law legal practice (as opposed to doctrine) in the 
Framers’ time, it is important to acknowledge that legal publications from the era often contained 
contradictions.  One volume called for specifying the underlying facts supporting a probable 
cause assertion in one suggested application form, but not in another.112 And it is common to 
find application forms that did not require the specification of underlying facts in volumes that 
elsewhere suggested a judicial sentryship role.113 This is in addition to other discrepancies.114 
These discrepancies leave us in a state of ambiguity that I doubt can be conclusively resolved.  
But, as I have already suggested, a likely result is that the non-elite lawyers and justices of the 
peace who directly engaged in warrant procedure would have resolved these uncertainties by 
treating sentryship as optional rather than mandatory.115 
[t]he desire to distinguish trained advocates who were worthy to appear before the 
highest courts from mere attorneys, or, more disparagingly, pettifoggers, whose 
mechanical knowledge of forms and pleading fitted them, at most, for 
appearances before lay justices of the peace, burned brightly in the hearts of 
trained lawyers throughout the Revolutionary and antebellum periods.  John 
Adams carried on a personal crusade against the lowly tribe. 
LAPIANA, supra note 73, at 44 (emphasis added and citation omitted).  LaPiana helpfully reprints 
a young law school graduate’s personal “definition of a pettifogger”: 
 
“Pettyfoggers are those who without any preparatory study enter our lower courts 
with a few snatches of what they call law picked up at the Corners of Streets.  
These they rant & rave—quibble upon words—stammer & quarrel & raise often 
not a petty fog, but a great one—to the total eclipse of Common Sense & the 
discomfiture of justice.” 
Id. at 44-45 (citation omitted) (quoting Diary of Aaron Barlow Olmstead, p. 211.  New-York 
Historical Society (Misc. Microfilms, reel 14)). 
112 Compare the citations to DAVIS, TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824 in notes 74 versus 75, 
supra.
113 Compare the citations to 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824 in notes 105 and 
123 versus 73, 120-121 and accompanying text, supra, or the citations to BURN’S AMERICAN 
JUSTICE ABRIDGMENT 1792 in notes 105 versus 74-75, supra.
114 See, e.g., supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text, and infra note 166. 
115 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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b. Search Warrant Forms 
As is true today, the content of search warrants during the Framers’ era did not allow for 
meaningful verification that the issuing judge had inquired into the specific facts supporting a 
probable cause assertion.  Warrants today are not required to say anything about probable 
cause.116 They tend at most to declare only that probable exists, without specifying the 
underlying facts supporting it.117 Similarly, the practice in the Framers’ era was that American 
search warrants at most asserted the general existence of adequate suspicion.  A common 
formulation in these warrants was to state that the applicant “hath probable cause to suspect, and 
doth suspect,” while uniformly failing to detail the supporting facts.118 
116 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2) (omitting any mention of probable cause from required 
contents of a warrant).  This was not always the case.  The original version of Rule 41 required 
each warrant to “state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) 
(1946), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. ch. 21A at 1979-80 (1946 ed.) (1947).  This requirement had 
replaced an identical statutory mandate.  See 18 U.S.C. § 616 (1940 ed.) (1941); see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 611-616 (1946 ed.) (1947) (indicating withdrawal of § 616 because its contents “are 
now covered by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure”).  The requirement was 
eliminated on the basis that it constituted “unnecessary paper work” because “[a] person who 
wishes to challenge the validity of a search warrant has access to the affidavits upon which the 
warrant was issued.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes 1972 amendments. 
117 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Groh v. Ramirez, No. 02-811, 2002 WL 
32101201 at 26a (S. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002) (pincite accessible through pdf link). 
118 E.g., Search Warrant On The Above Complaint, in ATTORNEY’S COMPANION: NEW-
YORK 1818, supra note 104, at 436; Form Of A Search Warrant, in BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 74, at 324; Search Warrant On The Above Complaint, in 
CLERK’S ASSISTANT 1805, supra note 104, at 237; Forms, &c. For Search Warrants, in DAVIS,
TREATISE FOR JUSTICES 1824, supra note 74, at 215-16; Search Warrant On The Above 
Complaint, in id. at 239-40; Form Of A Search Warrant On The Above Complaint, in EWING,
TREATISE ON JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 1805, supra note 104, at 507; A Complaint And Warrant To 
Search For Stolen Goods, in FESSENDEN, AMERICAN CLERK’S COMPANION 1815, supra note 105, 
at 284-85; Search Warrant Forms, in FREEMAN, MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 1802, supra note 105, 
at 296-97; Search Warrant Forms, in FREEMAN, MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 1795, supra note 105, 
at 269-70; Form Of A Search-Warrant, in GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 1810, 
supra note 74, at 400; Form Of A Search Warrant, in HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1820, 
supra note 74, at 623-24; Form Of A Search Warrant, in HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, 
supra note 74, at 416 (general warrant); Form Of A Search Warrant, in HENING, NEW VIRGINIA 
JUSTICE 1795, supra note 74, at 405; Form Of A Search Warrant, in HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA 
JUSTICE 1822, supra note 74, at 409; Form Of A [S]earch Warrant, in FRANCOIS-XAVIER 
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One difference in modern versus Framing-era search warrant procedural standards 
provides an important reason for doubting that judges during the earlier period served as 
probable cause sentries.  Modern procedures provide a reliable mechanism for determining 
whether a judge independently and appropriately assessed probable cause prior to issuing a 
warrant, but no comparably reliable procedure existed during the Framers’ era.  Modern practice 
requires the preservation of the detailed facts provided to the judge in support of a probable 
cause claim (commonly in the form of an affidavit or recorded testimony), which in conjunction 
with the warrant provides the mechanism through which a search target can assess whether the 
search was properly allowed and conducted.119 Though there is a bit of authority that a 
comparable procedure was available during the Framers’ era, it is likely that in many cases only 
a less reliable, wholly post hoc inquiry was available.  Dane’s abridgment indicates that 
 
MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 281 (1791) (adopted to 
North Carolina law); Form Of A Search Warrant On The Above Complaint, in NEW CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES 1803, supra note 74, at 406; Form Of A Search Warrant, in PARKER,
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 316-17; Warrant,
in PERLEY, MAINE JUSTICE 1823, supra note 105, at 264-65; Search Warrant, in PRECEDENTS 
FOR THE USE OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 10 (1822) (adopted to Pennsylvania law); Search 
Warrant, in STARKE, JUSTICE OF PEACE 1774, supra note 80, at 160; Form Of The Warrant For 
Entering Suspected Houses, in id. at 337-38 (regulatory search warrant concerning tobacco); 
Form Of The Warrant To Go On Board A Ship, &c. In Search Of Uninspected Tobacco, in id. at 
338; Form Of A Search Warrant, in id. at 352; Warrant To Search For Stolen Goods, And 
Apprehend The Felon, in A COLLECTION OF ENGLISH PRECEDENTS, RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF
A JUSTICE OF PEACE 36, in THE YOUNG CLERK’S VADE MECUM: OR, COMPLEAT LAW-TUTOR 
(1776) [hereinafter VADE MECUM] (printed in New York); see also A Search Warrant, With The 
Complaint, in BURN’S AMERICAN JUSTICE ABRIDGMENT 1792, supra note 74, at 468-69; Warrant 
To Search For Stolen Goods, in A COLLECTION OF ENGLISH PRECEDENTS, RELATING TO THE 
OFFICE OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 34, in VADE MECUM, supra (general warrant stating that 
complainant “hath informed me”).  The vast majority of these examples, which relate to warrants 
for stolen goods, are applicable to the regulatory context as well because customs search 
warrants were issued in the same manner as warrants for stolen goods.  See PARKER,
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1801, supra note 74, at 374. 
119 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978); United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565 (1991).  This preservation requirement helps justify the repeal of a previous 
mandate that the warrant specify the facts supporting probable cause.  See supra note 116. 
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applications were “usually annexed” to the warrant,120 and that the “good and certain cause” 
supporting the search “ought to be found in” the application.121 But, as discussed above, very 
often these application forms did not call for the underlying facts to be specified.122 Even the 
suggested application form found in Dane’s abridgment itself omits these specifics!123 Thus, 
justices of the peace reviewing these search warrant applications often lacked the necessary 
information to scrutinize probable cause unless they took the initiative to obtain it orally from the 
applicant prior to issuing the requested warrant. 
Whether judges did so is open to more debate than has generally been recognized.  This 
point is easy to miss because of the instinctive tendency to locate in historical material that which 
we are predisposed to finding.  It is natural for us to presume that in the Framers’ era judges 
meaningfully assessed probable cause, including in the civil search arena.  After all, civil search 
legislation from this period often required warrants, and conditioned the issuance of those 
warrants upon suspicion.124 And, of course, the Fourth Amendment explicitly requires probable 
cause before a warrant can issue.  Given the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with which we are 
most familiar, in which judges have played a probable cause sentryship role since at least the 
mid-1900s,125 it is tempting to presume that judges have occupied this role since the nation’s 
founding.  This is particularly so if one believes that, during the earlier era, only complainants 
having personal information could apply for and obtain warrants (a proposition about which I 
 
120 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra note 73, at 245 § 2 n.*. 
121 Id. at 247 § 4. 
122 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
123 See the citation to 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824 in note 105, supra.
124 See supra note 55. 
125 See infra notes 180-183 and accompanying text. 
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have doubts),126 which should have made it easy for judges to orally inquire into the facts 
underlying a probable cause claim. 
A supposition that judges would have orally inquired is premised upon a belief that 
judges understood and accepted that the law imposed a probable cause sentryship role upon 
them.  Only if so would they have felt compelled to orally question an applicant who had not 
otherwise provided details supporting a probable cause claim.  But, for reasons I have already 
 
126 Professor Davies adheres to this proposition.  See Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at 650-51.  His support for this assertion comes from a brief passage 
in Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 651 
n.289.  The passage states that warrants to search for stolen goods: 
 
are not to be granted without oath made before the justice of a felony committed, 
and that the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect they are in such a 
house or place, and do sh[o]w his reasons of such suspicion. 
2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1736, supra note 61, at 150; accord 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 1800, supra note 61, at 150.  American treatises and justice manuals, often citing Hale, 
commonly reiterated this same or similar language.  See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying 
text.  I am not persuaded that these passages offer sufficient support for Davies’s conclusion, for 
several reasons. 
Although Davies’s conclusion is plausible, it is not clear to me that during the Framers’ 
era one could have “probable cause to suspect” only from personal knowledge.  Davies’s 
conclusion presumes that “probable cause” was given the same interpretation during the 
Framers’ era as we give it today.  However, there is reason to doubt this.  Evidence indicates that 
during this earlier period “probable cause” was given a much laxer interpretation, under which it 
more closely correlated to a mere hunch or belief than to its generally more demanding modern 
interpretation.  Compare infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text, with Nathanson v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (rejecting “mere affirmance of suspicion or belief without 
disclosure of supporting facts or circumstances” as basis for issuing customs warrant) and Byars 
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (holding inadequate assertion that warrant applicant 
“has good reason to believe and does believe” that defendant possessed contraband).  Thus, there 
is reason to believe that in the Framers’ era a complainant validly could have sworn an “oath” 
that he had “probable cause” while at the same time lacking the sort of supporting facts that we 
would expect today.  This would have enabled a complainant to obtain a search warrant while 
lacking any meaningful personal knowledge.  If this is correct, it suggests that Davies might be 
mistaken in claiming that only direct personal knowledge was sufficient during the Framers’ era 
(while hearsay evidence can be sufficient today).  Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra 
note 10, at 650-51. 
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explained,127 and others I will set forth below, justices of the peace presented with search warrant 
applications easily could have concluded that they did not have an absolute duty to engage in 
probable cause sentryship. 
 
3. Plain Text 
A plain text analysis provides reason for doubting the sentryship thesis.  From this 
perspective, the strongest evidence that judges monitored probable cause in the context of 
searches derives from the passages indicating that a search warrant applicant had to “show” or 
“assign” his reasons for suspicion.128 But for sentryship adherents there is room for discomfort 
here.  Is it really clear that these sources are mandating that judges adopt a sentryship role, as 
opposed to implying that such a role is proper, or perhaps merely suggesting such a role?  It is 
somewhat odd that an affirmative judicial duty to inquire into the facts underlying probable 
cause was never expressly and cleanly stated. 
Also, focus upon the soft language that dominates this material.  The weak language 
used, dominated by the subjunctive tense of words like “ought,”129 or merely suggestive 
language like “it is fitting”130 or “cannot well be too tender,”131 easily (and perhaps naturally) 
may have caused judges to believe that probable cause sentryship was an optional rather than 
mandatory role for them to play.  Much like today, these words and phrases may have merely 
suggested a course of action rather than conveying a mandatory imperative.  For example, 
though it is possible to attribute a mandatory meaning to “ought,” a more natural interpretation is 
 
127 See supra Part II(B)(1). 
128 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 61, 69, 71, 73 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra notes 61-62, 69 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra notes 64, 79 and accompanying text. 
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to treat it as equivalent to the merely suggestive “should.”132 In terms of usage during the 
Framers’ era, there is good reason to believe that, like today, neither “ought” nor phrases like “it 
is fitting” normally expressed compulsion.133 
We can have some confidence that during the Framers’ era “ought” was not necessarily 
interpreted as conveying a compulsory or mandatory meaning because the Framers do not appear 
 
132 It is possible for “ought” to be used in a mandatory sense, but this is not its most 
natural meaning, which is that “ought” is more equivalent to “should.”  Compare WEBSTER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1020 (1989) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1989] (under the entry for “ought,” listing only “must” as a synonym), 
with id. at 944 (stating, under definition of “must,” that “ought” is “weaker than MUST”); see also 
Hannon v. Myrick, 111 A.2d 729, 731 (Vt. 1955).  Given these various shades of meaning, it is 
best to interpret “ought” as mandatory only when an unusual context so demands.  See Life 
Ass’n of Am. v. St. Louis County Bd. of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, 519 (1872).  I further 
acknowledge, however, that the mandatory usage has not always been so limited.  See Jackson v. 
State, 22 S.W. 831, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893). 
133 Today, “ought” is commonly “used to express duty,” “obligation,” “propriety,” or 
“appropriateness.”  WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1989, supra note 132, at 1020.  This is consistent 
with its meaning during the Framers’ era.  One source indicates that “ought” expresses “duty or 
obligation of any kind,” including “weaker shades of meaning” such as “expressing what is 
befitting, proper, correct, advisable, or naturally expected,” as well as that one is “bound or under 
obligation” or “duty . . . to do it.”  1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 2018 (1988) (fifth definition at micropage 236).  This source provides numerous 
examples of such usage from the Framers’ era, including examples from 1749, 1812, and 1818, 
including a 1771 example, “The precedent ought to be followed.”  Id. If judges during the 
Framers’ era were instructed that they “ought” to serve as probable cause sentries to the same 
extent they “ought” to follow precedent, then the sentryship role was not compulsory, but instead 
merely suggestive, as is the judicial duty to follow precedent.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991); see generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role Of Precedent In Constitutional 
Decisionmaking And Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare 
Decisis And Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). 
Dictionaries from the Framers’ era confirm this usage.  They define “ought” as being 
obliged by duty, as well as to “be fit” or “be necessary.”  E.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1792) (unpaginated; see alphabetical listing for “ought”) 
[hereinafter JOHNSON DICTIONARY 1792]; NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 224 (1817) [hereinafter WEBSTER DICTIONARY 1817].  “Fit,” as in “it is fitting,” cf. 
supra note 130 and accompanying text, meant “proper” or “convenient,” while “fitly” meant 
“properly,” “justly,” “reasonably,” and “conveniently.”  JOHNSON DICTIONARY 1792, supra 
(unpaginated; see alphabetical listings for “fit” and “fitly”); WEBSTER DICTIONARY 1817, supra, 
at 128-29.  If something is “convenient,” then it is not, of course, compulsory, a point that fits 
nicely with another part of my argument.  See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. __:____] Searches & History Of Suspicion & Probable Cause: Part One 42 
to have ascribed such a meaning to it.  They went out of their way to replace the phrase “ought 
to” with “shall” when drafting the Full Faith and Credit Clause.134 The Bill of Rights also gives 
us abundant reasons for believing that the Framers preferred “shall” over “ought” when seeking 
to express an absolute obligation.  Over and over again, state conventions used “ought” in 
proposed amendments they suggested for inclusion in a Bill of Rights, and “ought” also 
predominated in existing provisions that may have served as models for the amendments, but the 
Framers consistently chose to use “shall.”  This evidence is found not only in relation to the 
Fourth Amendment itself,135 but also in relation to the First Amendment’s Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses,136 its Free Speech and Free Press Clauses,137 and its Assembly and 
 
134 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 486, 489 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911); see generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith And Credit To Judgments And Public 
Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 58-59 (1957). 
135 For example, of the six states that proposed amendments concerning search and 
seizure, four used “ought” (Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia), only one used 
“shall” (Pennsylvania), and the sixth (Massachusetts) used an inapposite formulation.  THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 232-33 (Neil H 
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].  Another proposal voiced between 
two Framers, and which was published in a newspaper, used “shall.”  Id. at 236.  Of nine 
colonial and state search and seizure provisions that preceded the Fourth Amendment and may 
have served as models for it, eight used “ought” while only one used “shall.”  Id. at 234-35.  
Despite the pervasiveness of “ought,” the Framers chose to use “shall” in the Fourth 
Amendment.  See supra note 1. 
136 Of the eight states that proposed amendments speaking to these issues, four used 
“ought” (New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia), two used “shall” (New 
Hampshire and Pennsylvania), and the remaining two proposals (by Maryland and 
Massachusetts) used inapposite formulations.  COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 11-
13.  Nonetheless, the Framers chose to use “shall” in the First Amendment.  See U.S. CONST.
amend. I. 
137 Of the seven states that proposed amendments speaking to these issues, four used 
“ought” (New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia), only one used “shall” 
(Pennsylvania), and the remaining two proposals (by Maryland and Massachusetts) used 
inapposite formulations.  COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, 92-93.  Another proposal 
voiced between two Framers, and which was published in a newspaper, used “shall.”  Id. at 96.  
Of seventeen colonial, state, and English free speech and free press provisions that preceded the 
First Amendment and may have served as models for it, eight used “ought,” four used “shall,” 
and another five used inapposite formulations.  Id. at 93-96.  In spite of the pervasiveness of 
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Petition Clauses;138 the Third Amendment;139 the Seventh Amendment;140 and the Eight 
Amendment.141 
Undoubtedly, whether “ought” was perceived to have a different meaning than “shall” 
during the Framers’ era will be subject to disagreement.  Though some commentators agree with 
 
“ought,” the Framers chose to use “shall” in the First Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
138 Of the six states that proposed amendments relating to these issues (Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia), none used “shall.”  
Instead, they used formulations such as “every man hath” or “the people have” a “right” to 
assemble or petition.  COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 139-40.  Another proposal 
voiced between two Framers, and which was published in a newspaper, used “shall.”  Id. at 143.  
Of fifteen colonial, state, and English assembly and petition provisions that preceded the First 
Amendment and may have served as models for it, nearly all used “hath” or “have” formulations 
that were similar to the state proposals.  Id. at 140-43.  Only two (Massachusetts’s Body Of 
Liberties and England’s Tumultuous Petition Act of 1661) used “shall.”  Id. at 140, 142.  
Nonetheless, the Framers chose to use “shall” in the First Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
139 Of the six states that proposed amendments relating to quartering of soldiers, four 
used “ought” (New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia), only one used “shall” 
(New Hampshire), and the remaining proposal (by Maryland) used an inapposite formulation.  
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 215-216.  Of eleven colonial, state, and English 
provisions relating to this issue that preceded the Third Amendment and may have served as 
models for it, three used “ought,” four used “shall,” and four used inapposite formulations.  Id. at 
216-18.  The Framers chose to use “shall” in the Third Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. 
III. 
140 Of the eight states that proposed amendments relating to civil jury trials, four used 
“ought” (New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia), and the other four used “shall” 
(Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania).  COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 135, at 506-08.  However, of the many colonial, state, and English provisions relating to this 
issue that preceded the Seventh Amendment and may have served as models for it, the vast 
majority used “shall,” while only a handful used “ought.”  See id. at 508-18.  The Framers chose 
to use “shall” in the Seventh Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
141 Of the five states that proposed amendments relating to excessive bail or fines, and 
cruel or unusual punishments, all of them (New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and Virginia) used “ought.”  COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 613.  
“Ought” and “shall” were both widely used in the many colonial, state, and English provisions 
relating to this issue that preceded the Eighth Amendment and may have served as models for it.  
See id. at 613-17; see also Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969). The Framers chose to use 
“shall” in the Eighth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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my position, Professor Davies strongly disagrees.142 He argues that any “asserted difference is 
illusory and the different usages were only stylistic, rather than substantive,” and concludes that 
“[t]he evidence does not support the assertion that the framers understood ‘ought’ to be less 
binding or imperative than ‘shall.’ ”143 In any case, linguistic arguments do not hinge solely on 
the correct historical interpretation of “ought” versus “shall.” 
Consider too the changes that have occurred in the meaning of words and phrases in our 
language.  There is reason to believe that the phrase “probable cause” did not mean the same 
thing during the Framers’ era that it does now.  In the period from 1776 through around 1790, 
when the colonies declared independence and the Framers drafted the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights,144 “probable” had widely varying meanings.  As Cuddihy points out,145 it could mean 
“likely,”146 “credible,”147 or even “possible.”148 From today’s perspective, this last definition is 
remarkable.  In legal usage today, “possible” and “probable” are nearly antonyms.  When 
considering, for example, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, “possible” means 
nothing, or virtually nothing.  But “probable” means a great deal.  It is, indeed, the whole 
 
142 Professor Davies has quite thoroughly described the disagreement among 
commentators.  See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 676 n.350. 
143 Id. 
144 See supra note 100. 
145 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1527 & n.332. 
146 N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1721) [hereinafter 
BAILEY DICTIONARY 1721] (unpaginated; see alphabetical listing for “probable”); WILLIAM 
CRAKELT, ENTICK’S NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY 294 (1791); THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM 
PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1740) [hereinafter DYCHE DICTIONARY 
1740] (unpaginated; see alphabetical listing for “probable”); JOHNSON DICTIONARY 1792, supra 
note 133 (unpaginated; see alphabetical listing for “probable”); WEBSTER DICTIONARY 1817, 
supra note 133, at 251. 
147 DYCHE DICTIONARY 1740, supra note 146 (unpaginated; see alphabetical listing for 
“probable”). 
148 Id. 
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ballgame.  The two words, therefore, are defined completely differently.149 Certainly they are 
not used to define each other, as they were during the Framers’ era.  Recognizing these changes 
in language, Cuddihy concluded that “the Fourth Amendment assumed the least restrictive 
understanding of ‘probable cause’ then available, what might now be termed, ‘plausible cause’ 
or ‘possible cause.’ ”150 It seems likely, then, that during the Framers’ era the phrase “probable 
cause” could easily have been equated with a mere unreasoned “hunch,” rather than with a 
reasoned basis for belief grounded in an articulable set of underlying facts.  Those resistant to 
this conclusion should consider the centuries of history that confronted justices of the peace in 
the Framers’ era, in which non-existent or low levels of suspicion had been sufficient to justify 
governmental searches, as well as often lax interpretations given to “probable cause” both during 
the Framers’ era and well into the 1900s.151 
III. POST-INDEPENDENCE CIVIL SEARCH STATUTES: UNCERTAINTY 
REGARDING SENTRYSHIP 
In the Framers’ era, some civil search statutes either required, or were perceived to 
require, judges to issue warrants upon information on oath, depriving the judiciary of any 
 
149 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1166, 1201 (6th ed. 1990); WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 
1989, supra note 132, at 1122, 1146.  Black’s Law Dictionary underwent a substantial revision 
after the 6th edition.  See generally Peter Tiersma, The New Blacks’s, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 386
(2005).  More recent editions have dropped the definitions of “probable” and “possible.” 
150 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1527. 
151 See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause And Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics Of 
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 479-93 (1984).  In addition to providing 
extensive historical coverage, Grano discusses Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 
and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), both of which involved warrantless 
searches, as more recent cases in which probable cause was given a relaxed interpretation.  In 
each of those cases, though law enforcement agents had some knowledge that might arouse 
suspicion, it was months old and probable cause for the specific searches and seizures was found 
to exist based upon little more than observation of the defendants driving on roadways. 
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discretion with which to monitor prior suspicion.152 At least with regard to one prominent early 
federal civil search statute, the 1789 Collection Act, Professor Davies believes that such a 
reading is incorrect.153 Nevertheless, solid grounds exist for believing that he is wrong,154 and 
even if he is right there is abundant evidence for believing that some statutes were perceived as 
depriving judges of discretion (even if mistakenly), resulting in the same outcome. 
According to Cuddihy, Americans viewed a 1773 English excise case, Bostock v. 
Saunders,155 as “the controlling British precedent on probable cause.”156 Professor Davies 
appears to agree because he correctly notes that Dane’s important 1824 Framing-era abridgment 
 
152 Cuddihy believes that some statutes required the judiciary to issue warrants upon 
application.  3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1193-94, 1351.  Professors Maclin and 
Sklansky agree.  See Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity, supra note 10, at 952 n.166; 
Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1798-99 & n.359. 
153 See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 711 n.470. 
154 The relevant 1789 Collection Act provision states: 
 
if [the officer] shall have cause to suspect a concealment [of uncustomed goods], 
in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, [he] shall, upon 
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a 
warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there 
to search for such goods . . . . 
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1861).  A plain text argument, emphasizing the 
mandatory language “shall . . . be entitled to a warrant,” supports the lack-of-judicial-discretion 
view.  Davies takes issue with this approach, arguing that it gives too little attention to the word 
“if” in the opening phrase “if [the officer] shall have cause.”  Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at 711 n.470. 
Though plausible, there are several weaknesses in Davies’s position.  First, it takes a 
restrictive view of the implications of explicit discretion-granting language the Framers used a 
mere two years later in Hamilton’s Excise Act of 1791.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 
Stat. 199, 207 (1861) (limiting issuance of search warrants to instances of “reasonable cause of 
suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction of [the] judge or justice”).  A defender of this Excise 
Act, in an address to the public, emphasized the discretion it gave to judges.  John Neville, An 
Address To The Citizens Of Westmoreland, Fayette, And Alleghany Counties On The Revenue 
Law, 3 GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (Dec 31, 1791).  Second, it mistakenly discounts 
various reasons, discussed in the text both before and after this note, for believing that judges at 
the time often may not have actively monitored probable cause prior to issuing search warrants. 
155 3 Wilson 434, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B. 1773). 
156 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1195. 
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“treated Bostock as the American doctrine.”157 Bostock supports the no-discretion thesis because 
the lead opinion declared that excise commissioners had no discretion to refuse a search warrant 
that an excise officer requested upon oath: 
I think the commissioners were bound to grant the warrant upon the oath of [the 
excise officer], and could not form any judgment upon the matter, the 
commissioners have no power to summon the suspected party or any witnesses, 
they cannot examine on both sides, so it was impossible for them to judge; if the 
commissioners had such power it would be nugatory, for the goods would be 
removed before such examination could be had.—I think the [statute] is 
compulsive upon the commissioners to grant the warrant to the officer to enter 
and search, upon his oath of suspicion that teas, &c. are fraudulently 
concealed . . . .158 
Davies acknowledges that “Framing-era American lawyers were probably familiar with 
Bostock.”159 This would have further undermined any judicial inclination to scrutinize probable 
cause claims prior to issuing a requested warrant. 
Since Americans viewed Bostock as controlling, it was probably more important that the 
lead opinion declared its no-discretion thesis than whether it was correct on this point.  Certainly, 
there is ample basis to dispute the lead opinion’s view regarding discretion.  Two other justices 
did not opine on the matter, but a fourth disagreed with the lead opinion, writing that “the 
commissioners . . . have a discretionary power to grant such warrant.”160 His analysis seems 
more in keeping with the statute’s plain language, which provides that upon oath “setting forth 
 
157 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 652 n.294; cf. 5 NATHAN 
DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 559 § 11 (1824) [hereinafter 5 
DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824] (discussing that Bostock jury granted £200 verdict 
against customs officers who conducted an unsuccessful search under warrant that officers 
themselves swore out); 7 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra note 73, at 244-46 § 2 
(same); but see infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (explaining that Bostock had been 
overruled in 1785, and citing one 1801 American treatise that correctly noted this development).  
For the importance of Dane’s abridgment, see supra note 73. 
158 3 Wilson at 440, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145 (de Grey, Lord Chief Justice) (emphasis 
added). 
159 Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 652 n.294. 
160 3 Wilson at 442, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1146 (Nares, J.). 
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the ground of . . . suspicion, it shall and may be lawful” for the commissioners or justices to issue 
a search warrant.161 Though this language is arguably ambiguous on the discretion issue, it 
adequately supports the Bostock description of the statute, made at least twice in the opinion, as 
providing that excise commissioners “may” grant a warrant.162 Further, a later English case, 
Cooper v. Boot,163 clearly disagreed with the Bostock lead opinion on the discretion issue.  Both 
Bostock and Cooper reviewed the validity of a warrant-based excise search conducted under the 
same statute.164 In complete opposition to the earlier Bostock lead opinion, the Cooper court 
declared in dicta that a judicial sentryship duty existed.165 
Nevertheless, because the lead opinion fell in the no-discretion camp, Bostock is a 
powerful indicator that even American judges who took some care to research the issue may 
have concluded they lacked discretion to monitor probable cause.  Importantly, Bostock appears 
to have been considered controlling in America throughout the Framers’ era because Dane was 
citing to it as late as 1824, in spite of Cooper having overruled Bostock on a separate immunity 
issue in 1785.166 Moreover, Professor Davies has identified this, as well as other reasons, for 
 
161 10 Geo. I, ch. 10, § 13 (1723) (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
162 3 Wilson at 435, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1142; 3 Wilson at 441, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145 (Gould, 
J.). 
163 4 Douglas 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785). 
164 The statute at issue in both Bostock and Cooper was 10 Geo. I, chapter 10, section 13 
(see supra note 161 for complete citation).  Cooper, 4 Douglas at 340, 348, 99 Eng. Rep. at 912, 
916; Bostock, 3 Wilson at 439, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1144 (de Grey, Lord Chief Justice). 
165 See supra note 69. 
166 Cooper overruled Bostock on the issue of whether an excise officer could be held 
liable for trespass when acting pursuant to a search warrant issued under the officer’s own oath 
(as opposed to a separate informer’s oath).  Bostock allowed liability.  See 3 Wilson at 440-42, 
95 Eng. Rep. at 1145-46.  Bostock therefore limited the immunizing effect of a warrant.  In 
Cooper, the court acknowledged that its case “appears to be exactly the same with that of 
Bostock v. Saunders.”  Cooper, 4 Douglas at 347, 99 Eng. Rep. at 916.  Yet, the court rejected 
liability, stating that “we cannot bring ourselves to coincide in the [Bostock] judgment.”  Cooper, 
4 Douglas at 348-50, 99 Eng. Rep. at 916-17. 
Nonetheless, Dane cited Bostock as controlling.  See supra note 157 and accompanying 
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believing that Cooper may not have been well known in the United States until after 1831,167 
thus calling into doubt the impact it had in establishing a judicial sentryship duty regarding 
probable cause during the Framers’ era. 
 
IV. IMPLAUSIBILITY OF EARLY SENTRYSHIP IN LIGHT OF SLOW 
DEVELOPMENT OF SENTRYSHIP JURISPRUDENCE 
One potentially powerful objection to my assertion that judges during the Framers’ era 
often may not have monitored probable cause prior to issuing warrants is that I am giving 
insufficient attention the Fourth Amendment itself.  This argument would assert that, even if I 
am correct about the lack of judicial sentryship of probable cause under the common law, a
fundamental point of the Fourth Amendment was to abrogate this portion of the common law 
through constitutional mandate.  And the Fourth Amendment explicitly states that “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”168 So, this objection would continue, how could the 
Framers have been any clearer about requiring judicial sentryship of probable cause, as well as 
their intent to abrogate the common law to the extent it had allowed judges to issue warrants 
without scrutinizing probable cause?  Further, numerous colonial and state declarations of rights 
and constitutional provisions that preceded the Fourth Amendment also implied a probable cause 
 
text.  This is surprising given that Dane briefly cited and discussed Cooper at least twice in other 
volumes of his abridgment.  See 2 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW 728 § 8 (1823); 5 DANE’S AMERICAN ABRIDGMENT 1824, supra note 157, at 580 
§§ 5-6. 
167 Davies has identified reasons for believing that Cooper’s first publication was likely 
no earlier than 1801, and that it was not more widely published until 1831.  See Davies, Original 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 561 n.19, 652 n.294. 
It must be noted, however, that not only had Dane briefly cited and discussed Cooper 
near the end of the Framers’ era (see supra note 166), but at least one American treatise during 
the Framers’ era correctly noted in 1801, decades before the publication of Dane’s abridgment, 
that Cooper had overruled Bostock. 1 ISAAC ’ESPINASSE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS 
AND TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 395 (2d Am. ed., 1801).  Further, at least one court during the 
Framers’ era noted the overruling.  Simpson v. Smith, 2 Del. Cas. 285, _(*4)__ (Del. 1817). 
168 See supra note 1. 
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sentryship duty, such as by requiring that “cause,” “foundation,” or “evidence” be presented 
before a warrant could issue.169 Moreover, all of this is in addition to other compelling evidence 
supporting that, even before the Fourth Amendment, the common law imposed upon judges a 
duty to be probable cause sentries.170 
My answer to this objection is that the language in the Fourth Amendment, as well as in 
the colonial and state fundamental rights provisions, is not actually particularly clear on this 
point.  To say that no warrant shall issue but upon “probable cause,” “cause,” “foundation,” or 
“evidence” leaves several important questions unanswered.  These formulations do not, for 
example, cleanly establish how probable cause is to be assured.  They also do not necessarily 
clarify who is supposed to assure the existence of probable cause.  These omissions are 
particularly troublesome in light of prevailing practice during the Framers’ era.  Was probable 
cause sufficiently “assured” if the requesting officer was willing to swear, on oath, that it existed, 
and risk personal trespass liability?  Or did an issuing judge have to be independently satisfied 
that probable cause had been established?  Or was it enough that a jury, after an ex post 
examination, thought probable cause had existed at the time the search warrant had issued? 
I do not want to overstate this case, as I do share the opinion that the most natural reading 
of the Warrant Clause is that it called for judicial sentryship of probable cause.  But the point I 
am making is that it is not clear to me that the same reading would necessarily have prevailed 
during the Framers’ era.  To those whose initial impression is to find my uncertainty farfetched, I 
point to those Framing-era justice manuals (all of them American) and treatises that continued to 
assert, well after the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, that probable-cause-sentryship was 
 
169 These predecessors to the Fourth Amendment are helpfully compiled in COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 135, at 234-35. 
170 See supra Part II(A). 
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convenient but not necessary.171 If the Fourth Amendment was immediately and clearly 
understood to impose a judicial sentryship duty regarding probable cause, one would expect all 
these justice manuals and treatises to have taken note of this development and omitted the 
convenient-but-not-necessary guidance as soon as the Fourth Amendment came into effect.  But 
we know that this did not occur.  The Fourth Amendment became effective in December 1791.172 
Yet, American justice manuals continued to include the convenient-but-not-necessary guidance 
as late as 1810173 and 1820,174 and even the first American edition of the highly influential 
Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown continued to include this guidance when it was published much later 
in 1847.175 
The question then becomes whether the judicial sentryship adherents can adequately 
explain this discrepancy.  The answer is that they might.  But then again, they might not.  A 
possible, but inadequate, explanation for the discrepancy might be simple editorial 
incompetence.  It could be that the Fourth Amendment was meant to codify a judicial sentryship 
duty, but the treatises and American justice manuals improperly failed to account for that 
development and, as a result, did not modify their guidance about common law requirements.  
The difficulty with this explanation is that it fails to account for the impact of this oversight.  The 
guidance the treatises and American justice manuals provided may have been wrong, but the 
readers probably depended upon, and applied, that guidance.  This is particularly so given the 
educational, training, and research limitations during the Framers’ era.176 If justices of the peace 
 
171 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra note 100. 
173 GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 1810, supra note 74, at 479. 
174 HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1820, supra note 74, at 699. 
175 See supra note 83 and accompanying text; supra notes 60, 76-77 and accompanying 
text (regarding how influential Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown was in the new nation). 
176 See supra notes 86-88, 106-111 and accompanying text. 
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were following the guidance available in American justice manuals, for example, and noticed the 
convenient-but-not-necessary language, they quite likely would have applied it.  If so, one cannot 
say that judges operated under a universal sentryship duty during the Framers’ era because no 
such duty would have been implemented in practice. 
A different, though also probably insufficient, basis for justifying the discrepancy might 
be that the federal Constitution was deemed inapplicable to state common law, which was what 
the justice manuals discussed.177 This explanation is attractive from a formalistic standpoint.  If 
federal versus state search and seizure jurisprudence were treated as distinct, then the 
discrepancy would be justified and not represent a contradiction.  The problem with this 
explanation is that search and seizure jurisprudence during the Framers’ era often was not 
formalistic.  For instance, it was common for litigants and judges in state search and seizure 
decisions from the era to discuss the Fourth Amendment as if it were applicable outside its 
federal purview.178 Thus, whether the discrepancy can be adequately explained is far from clear. 
Another, and perhaps more troublesome, problem for those who believe that a sentryship 
ethic was implemented in early practice is that it ignores not only the evolution of probable cause 
jurisprudence, but also how slowly sentryship jurisprudence developed.  If judicial sentryship of 
probable cause had been as well established upon the Fourth Amendment’s adoption as often 
seems to be supposed, one would not expect to see an abundant and lengthy development of 
 
177 The Fourth Amendment was not deemed applicable to the states until Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), and did not become more fully applicable until Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (overruling Wolf). 
178 See, e.g., Patterson v. Blackiston, 1 Del. Cas. 571, 572 (Del. 1818); Dale v. Hamilton, 
2 Del. Cas. 216, 219 (Del. C.P. 1804); Connor v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38, 40 (Pa. 1810); 
Wells v. Jackson, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 458, 474-75 (1811) (Roane, J.).  Some of these decisions 
refer to the Fourth Amendment as the Sixth Amendment due to an anomaly explained supra note 
15. 
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probable cause jurisprudence related to the sentryship issue.  Yet, that is exactly what our law 
books show. 
Probable cause jurisprudence evolved over a long period, slowly at first but then 
accelerating through the mid-1900s.  It was not until over 20 years after the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted that the Supreme Court attempted to clarify what “probable cause” means, defining 
it as “less than evidence which would justify condemnation.”179 Fast-forward into the next 
century, and it is evident that probable cause jurisprudence was still developing.  Within a six-
year period around 1930 the Court twice had to demand that warrant applications contain 
sufficient underlying factual detail to allow the judge to independently assess probable cause.  In 
the first case the Court held invalid a warrant that had issued only upon the applicant’s averment 
that he “has good reason to believe and does believe” that defendant possessed contraband.180 
This is substantively similar to the “hath probable cause to suspect, and doth suspect” 
formulation that was often found in search warrant application forms from way back in the 
 
179 Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).  This suggests the 
possibility that, during the more than 20 intervening years, judges who may have opted to serve 
as probable cause sentries were applying a less stringent standard, raising the prospect that they 
may not have acted as meaningful probable cause sentries at all. 
It is worth noting that Locke, a forfeiture case, defined “probable cause” as it was used in 
a statute.  Technically, Locke was not a Fourth Amendment case. 
180 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).  Even after Byars, this type of 
formulation continued to remain valid until the 1960s in cases where authorities premised 
probable cause upon an informant.  It was not until Aguilar v. Texas that the Supreme Court 
rejected a police affidavit that had merely asserted the existence of “reliable information from a 
credible person.”  378 U.S. 108, 109, 113-14 & n.4 (1964).  Aguilar ruled that an affiant relying 
upon an informant’s tip must (1) indicate the informant’s basis of knowledge, and (2) provide 
information permitting the judge to decide whether or not the informant was trustworthy.  Id. at 
114, overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (adopting totality-of-the-
circumstances test).  “[T]he government,” however, “need never divulge the identity of the 
informant.”  Thomas, Madison Rewrites Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 1491 (citing 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)).  For findings regarding the use of confidential 
informants, some troubling and others more reassuring, see Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. 
Samarkos, Searching For Narcotics In San Diego: Preliminary Findings From The San Diego 
Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221 239-44 (2000). 
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Framers’ era.181 In the second case the Court rejected a warrant that had been issued “upon mere 
affirmance of suspicion or belief.”182 The issuance of these warrants, about 140 years after the 
Fourth Amendment’s adoption, hardly seems consistent with an understood and applied judicial 
ethic of probable cause sentryship.  Even more notably, it was not until 1958 that the Court 
confirmed that the magistrate confronted with a warrant application “must judge for himself the 
persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a [complainant] to show probable cause.  He should not 
accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought 
has committed a crime.”183 If the Fourth Amendment made it so clear that judges were to act as 
probable cause sentries, why was the Court still having to define this role over 165 years after the 
amendment’s adoption? 
One way to explain why the Court was still answering these questions is to acknowledge 
that the law confronted judges with conflicting imperatives.  To the extent that specific warrants 
were valued in part because they immunized searchers,184 judges had an incentive to generously 
issue such warrants, which would have disinclined them from aggressively gate-keeping during 
the application process.  Additionally, regulatory (not criminal) searches were probably the most 
common type of governmental search that occurred during the Framers’ era.185 Often the 
dynamics in the regulatory context would have discouraged judicial sentryship, as all 
governmental officials involved, including judges, would have worried about delay undermining 
the warrant application process.  Like today, judges were sensitive to such delay, which could 
 
181 See supra note 105. 
182 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933). 
183 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). 
184 See Amar, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 10, at 79-80; Amar, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 10, at 771-72, 774, 779; Bradley, supra note 29, at 833-38. 
185 See Thomas, Madison Rewrites Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 1459 n.36 
(“When the Framers thought ‘search and seizure,’ they almost certainly thought ‘customs.’ ”). 
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easily have been taken advantage of to abscond with contraband.186 A prime concern was with 
the mobility of search targets, such as the risk of a ship sailing away before a search warrant 
could be successfully obtained.187 Thus, regardless of elite legal doctrine, justices of the peace 
may have succumbed to disincentives to monitoring probable cause that they encountered as they 
actually engaged in search warrant practice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Search and seizure law in the Framers’ era differed markedly from ours today.  Probable 
cause is central to our conception of the Fourth Amendment and the protections it provides 
against overweening governmental searches.  Perhaps the Framers shared this conception of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Nevertheless, whether it actually played that role during the Framers’ era, 
at least in a similar way as it does today, is certainly debatable.  Undoubtedly, rhetoric existed 
regarding judicial sentryship of probable cause, and this rhetoric may have significantly 
influenced the Framers and other elites of the legal profession.  But evidence suggests that 
probable cause sentryship was treated quite differently in the lower courts, where non-elites 
implemented search and seizure law on a daily basis.  In the Framers’ world, non-elite justices of 
 
186 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); Cooper v. Boot, 4 
Douglas 339, 349, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916 (K.B. 1785) (“Suppose goods were actually in the 
house, and that they were taken out just before the warrant was executed.  Can it be said that the 
officer in that case would be a trespasser?”); Cooper v. Booth, 3 Espinasse 135, 146, 170 Eng. 
Rep. 564, 568 (K.B. 1785) (different reported version of same case) (“[S]uppose the goods 
actually in the house when the information was given, and taken out of it just before the warrant 
was executed, is it possible to say that the excise-officer . . . can be a trespasser?”); Bostock v. 
Saunders, 3 Wilson 434, 440, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141, 1145 (de Grey, Lord Chief Justice) (opining 
that excise commissioners should not examine requesting party before issuing warrants because 
“the goods would be removed before such examination could be had”); id., 2 Blackstone 912, 
914-15, 96 Eng. Rep. 539, 540 (different reported version of same case) (making similar point). 
187 See 3 CUDDIHY DISSERTATION, supra note 10, at 1549. 
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the peace may not have consistently acted as aggressive probable cause sentries prior to issuing 
search warrants. 
This conclusion is defensible regardless of one’s views on the debate regarding the nature 
of the judicial function in early America.  One side of the debate claims that the judicial function 
in early America was haphazard, undisciplined, and subject to the vagaries of “frontier 
justice.”188 Roscoe Pound believed that the “[s]cientific development of American law was 
retarded and even warped by the frontier spirit surviving the frontier,” and that “opposition to an 
educated well-trained bar and to an independent, experienced, permanent judiciary” resulted 
from a “lack of interest in universality and fostering of local peculiarities.”189 I cannot imagine 
how members of this school could believe in a unified and applied judicial sentryship ethic with 
regard to probable cause.  By definition, they believe in a judiciary that often lacked legal 
training and certainly lacked infrastructure, each of which are fundamental requisites to unified 
and consistently applied law. 
The other side of the debate asserts that, while far from mature, the judicial function 
during this period sought coherence and rigor by incorporating English common law and 
adjusting it over time to local realities and in light of the American creed.190 Given that 
limitations certainly did exist in legal training and legal research, it is quite likely that American 
justice manuals played an influential role.191 For the reasons already discussed in detail above, 
these justice manuals easily could have undermined any inclination to engage in probable cause 
sentryship. 
 
188 Conley, supra note 26, at 257 & n.1. 
189 POUND, supra note 87, at 118. 
190 See Conley, supra note 26, at 257 & n.4. 
191 See supra notes 86-87, 106-111 and accompanying text, and in particular note 88. 
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The conclusion that judges in the Framers’ era may not have consistently acted as 
probable cause sentries has potentially significant implications for our search and seizure 
jurisprudence today.  These implications concern both Fourth Amendment originalism and the 
Reasonableness-versus-Warrant Clause debate. 
As for originalism, the implications differ depending upon one’s views as to the current 
state of constitutional search and seizure law.  For those like Davies who believe that judges 
during the Framers’ era were expected to act as aggressive probable cause sentries,192 the 
presentation here challenges the relevance of legal doctrine.  By contrast, originalists who 
believe that the probable cause requirement should be lax may take comfort in my analysis.  But 
I suspect it will put many originalists to the test of their faith.  Abundant reasons exist to believe 
that, at least in practice, search warrants could be obtained in the Framers’ era upon a mere, 
unexamined assertion that probable cause existed.  If so, many originalists will have to confront 
the possibility that their favored analytical method may not lead to the results they prefer.  
Further, if we are to take the Supreme Court’s interest in Fourth Amendment originalism 
seriously,193 the historical understanding of suspicion and probable cause presented here raises 
fundamental issues.  Would the Court really be willing to return to a world in which 
constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence differed so radically from the system we have 
erected?  Returning to such a meaning of probable cause would constitute a revolutionary change 
in today’s Warrant Clause jurisprudence, testing the mettle of the originalists. 
 
192 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
193 Numerous commentators have questioned the usefulness of this endeavor, as well as 
whether the Court is sincere about it.  See, e.g., Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10; 
Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10; Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why 
The Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 
(2002); Sklansky, supra note 9. 
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My historical analysis can also be interpreted as harmonizing what many believe is 
current practice with our history.  Numerous commentators on the manuscript to this article 
believe that current Warrant Clause jurisprudence is, at most, comprised of demanding rhetoric 
that affords little protection in reality.  These commentators take the position that, while 
contemporary Warrant Clause jurisprudence may have occasionally mouthed a duty of 
aggressive judicial sentryship, in the trenches magistrates practice the moderate or lax versions 
of sentryship.194 If these commentators are correct, my analysis shows that the state of search 
 
194 It is certainly possible to discern tension between some of the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements concerning an aggressive sentryship requirement and indicators that judges 
might or might not be following this guidance.  An example of such a pronouncement is that 
magistrates must exercise independent judgment and not simply accept a warrant applicant’s 
conclusions.  Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). 
Some indicators could be interpreted as showing that judges are embracing this role.  For 
instance, one report concluded that “[t]he exclusionary rule affects only a relatively small 
percentage of arrests and searches,” and quoted an Assistant Prosecutor’s opinion that “[v]ery 
few” motions to suppress are granted.  SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y,
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 8, 16 (Nov. 1988).  
The report also concluded that “[a]dding together data on each of the stages of felony 
processing . . . we find that the cumulative loss resulting from illegal searches is in the range of 
0.6% and 0.8% to 2.35% of all adult felony arrests,” and recounted a survey finding that 
“roughly three[-]quarters of the judges and defense lawyers polled claim that 10% or less of the 
suppression motions filed are successful.”  Id. at 17.  Another study in San Diego found a zero 
percent success rate for motions to suppress over a given period.  Benner & Samarkos, supra 
note 180, at 264.  Low success rates on motions to suppress could be consistent with judges 
engaging in aggressive sentryship during the warrant application process since the higher level of 
scrutiny early in the process could help avoid constitutional infringements. 
On the other hand, the San Diego study resulted in findings consistent with a high degree 
of judge-shopping when police applied for search warrants, id. at 226-28, which raises the 
prospect that police favor judges who engage in lax sentryship.  Another report found that 
magistrates in one locale spent an average of “two minutes and forty[-]eight seconds” per 
warrant application, with the median being “two minutes and twelve seconds.”  RICHARD VAN 
DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 
26 (1985) (edition of 1984 report having same title by National Center for State Courts). Though 
it is possible for judges to engage in aggressive sentryship so quickly, the short time period does 
provide some reason for doubting that this is occurring. 
One commentator voiced another, but related, criticism that even if judges today exercise 
aggressive sentryship the end result is that the public still lacks sufficient protections due to the 
excessive deference to law enforcement interests that is evident in Fourth Amendment 
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and seizure law today can be seen as consistent with what it was during the Framers’ era:  at best 
a rhetorical flourish that often can have little substance, with warrants commonly issuing upon 
something more akin to “possible cause” rather than “probable cause.” 
If probable cause sentryship during the Framers’ era often took this weak form, this has 
implications for how originalism informs the Reasonableness-versus-Warrant Clause debate 
today.  Advocates for greater Fourth Amendment protections often focus upon suspicion and 
probable cause,195 especially as the Supreme Court expands the scope of allowable warrantless 
and even suspicionless searches.196 In doing so, these advocates are usually favoring the Warrant 
Clause approach.  One problem with these efforts is that they often are at odds with the Fourth 
Amendment’s text, which is actually quite enigmatic when it comes to suspicion and probable 
cause.197 Nowhere does the text even mention suspicion.  The Reasonableness Clause contains 
no reference to suspicion of any kind.  Instead, the concept is only implicitly addressed through 
 
jurisprudence.  Prime examples of such deference include exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
such as the good faith doctrine that was recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), the search incident to arrest doctrine as applied in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 
(1976) (exception justified officers’ seizure of heroin that spilled out of bag as result of struggle 
with defendant after warrantless entry into home), and the plain view doctrine as applied in Ker 
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (exception justified officers’ seizure of marijuana after 
warrantless entry into home to conduct warrantless arrest). 
Davies makes a somewhat similar point in arguing that modern decisions have gone a 
long way towards emasculating the Framers’ Warrant Clause.  He argues, for example, that 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), significantly relaxed the Framers’ probable cause 
standard, see Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 10, at 379-82, and would probably take 
similar aim at United States v. Leon. See also supra note 59. 
195 E.g., Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 24; Thomas, Remapping Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 24. 
196 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Donovan v. Dewey, 
452 U.S. 594 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Co. v. 
United States, 392 U.S. 72 (1970). 
197 See supra note 1. 
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probable cause, which is explicitly mentioned only in the Warrant Clause.  But, at least from an 
historical perspective, probable cause appears to be a much weaker protection than Warrant 
Clause adherents have previously acknowledged.  As this article explains, the probable cause 
protections that Warrant Clause adherents prefer, which are grounded in aggressive judicial 
sentryship, appear at odds with an historical understanding of probable cause, in which it is 
likely that sentryship took an aggressive form only inconsistently at best, and more likely ranged 
from lax to essentially non-existent. 
Another problem with continuing to emphasize probable cause or suspicion is that they 
are anachronistic prescriptions.  It is true that they are consistent with the common law, and 
constitutional, development of search and seizure law.  The Framers lived in an extremely 
limited regulatory world.  Emphasizing probable cause or suspicion for the most part worked 
well in this context.  The state’s limited regulatory reach continued to exist to a great degree until 
the New Deal.  But, after the advent of the modern regulatory state, the old prescription no 
longer works.  This approach was designed for a common law world of limited government that 
no longer exists.  We now live in a nation with pervasive regulation, both statutory and 
regulatory, which permeates most aspects of our daily lives.  To impose a probable cause or prior 
suspicion requirement in this context would emasculate many desirable regulatory regimes.198 
Professor Amar avers to this point when he writes that a “ ‘probable cause’ test for stolen goods 
cannot be a global test for all searches and seizures” because “often government will properly 
want to search for or seize such things with advance notice—inspecting restaurant food for 
contamination, or wires for electrical safety, or cars for emissions, or in a thousand other 
 
198 See Arcila, supra note 14, at 1240-46. 
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cases.”199 This demonstrates one of the gravest flaws of a Warrant Clause preference rule:  it 
cannot work in a regulatory world confronting diverse civil search needs.  This is a topic I will 
continue to explore in the article that will be “Part Two” of this series. 
 
199 Amar, Writs Of Assistance, supra note 10, at 64; see also Amar, Terry & Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at 1105 (“surely persons who pass through metal detectors at 
airports . . . are Fourth Amendment ‘persons’ . . . but this should not trigger an inflexible rule of 
warrants or probable cause, or even individualized suspicion”). 
